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This dissertation consists of three essays about retraining and human capital. In the first
essay, I study the equilibrium effects of retraining in an economy with directed job search. Not
only does retraining improve participants’ skills, it also changes non-participants’ optimal job
search strategies and, in turn, their re-employment outcomes. I find that retraining reduces
between-skill inequality, whereas it increases within-skill inequality. Eliminating retraining
causes welfare losses equivalent to a 1.5 percent drop in consumption. Evaluating various labor
market policies aimed to encourage retraining participation, I show that combining retraining
with a more generous unemployment insurance benefit is the most cost-effective and welfare-
maximizing policy.
The second essay explores the gender gap in retraining participation. I address four possible
explanations on what causes women to participate in retraining more actively than men. Using
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97), I discuss the role of social skills, occu-
pations, marital status, and non-college job opportunities. I find that the return to retraining
increases with participants’ social skills, which supports the hypothesis that retraining rates are
higher for women because they benefit more from retraining thanks to their high social skills.
I also raise the possibility that female-dominant professions are more supportive in terms of
workers’ education. Neither marital status nor non-college opportunities appear to explain the
gender gap in retraining.
In the third essay, I investigate the effects of academic collaboration on research productiv-
ity. The human capital of a group of researchers is combined by the CES production technology
and produces a research outcome measured by the quality of the paper. The estimated elas-
ticity of substitution suggests that researchers are imperfect complements. I use the estimates
to simulate the growth of human capital of a researcher under different collaboration scenar-
ios. I find that collaborating with an equally productive coauthor generates a considerable
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increase in human capital. The effects of collaboration persist over time. I show that the link
between human capital and collaboration opportunities play an important role in explaining
this persistence.
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1.0 Skill-Biased Technological Change, Inequality, and the Role of Retraining
1.1 Introduction
It has been well documented that the share of employment in middle-wage routine occu-
pations has declined in the U.S. labor market in large part due to automation and so-called
Skill-Biased Technological Change (David et al., 2006; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; David and
Dorn, 2013). This trend has worsened re-employment prospects for the unemployed who pre-
viously held such occupations. They are more likely to fall into long-term unemployment,
leave the labor force, or shift into low-wage service occupations (Lee and Wolpin, 2010; Cortes
et al., 2014, 2017). Retraining could help unemployed workers to obtain jobs in growing oc-
cupations and sectors that usually require greater cognitive skills. Despite its potential role,
retraining hasn’t received as much attention as other policy responses to unemployment, such
as unemployment insurance benefit or search assistance. To fill this gap, in this paper I study
retraining in an economy with directed job search and use it to investigate the equilibrium
effects of retraining on wage and employment.
I first document a set of novel stylized facts about retraining. Using the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth for both 1979 and 1997, I show how prevalent retraining is among
unemployed workers, what affects unemployed workers’ decisions to retrain, and whether it
improves their career prospects. I find that (a) retraining rates among unemployed workers
aged 23-34 in the NLSY79 are only around 2 percent, but the rates increase by about 5 per-
centage points in the NLSY97; (b) sex, race, marital status, learning ability, and asset holdings
affect unemployed workers’ participation in retraining; (c) the completion rate of retraining is
low; and (d) conditional on completing retraining, retraining participants are more likely to
get better-paying jobs that involve less routine, manual tasks and more non-routine, cognitive
tasks.
Based on this evidence, I build a model with directed job search and retraining. I consider
an economy comprised of two occupation groups (cognitive and routine), two types of workers
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(high- and low-skill) who are heterogeneous in several dimensions, and frictional labor markets.
The model has two important features. First, low-skill unemployed workers are given a chance
to upgrade their skills by participating in retraining. Retraining corresponds to college atten-
dance since most training for unemployed workers in the U.S. takes this form (Jacobson et al.,
2005a). Retraining entails an opportunity cost as well as monetary costs since participants need
to forgo labor market activities while retraining. The completion of retraining is assumed to
be stochastic, reflecting high college dropout rates among non-conventional students. Success-
ful completion of retraining ensures workers higher wages and a higher probability that they
leave the routine occupation for the non-routine cognitive occupation. As observed in the data,
unemployed workers’ age and wealth are primary determinants of retraining participation. Sec-
ond, the labor market features directed search. As in Menzio and Shi (2010), Menzio et al.
(2016), Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2014), and Herkenhoff et al. (2016), unemployed workers
decide which job to apply for. The labor market consists of multiple submarkets distinguished
by workers’ age, skill, and occupation. In each submarket, there is a continuum of firms that
offer various wages. In equilibrium, there is an inverse relationship between wages and job
finding rates. High-paying jobs are more difficult to obtain. Unemployed workers choose which
job to apply for by comparing wages against the probability of employment. Workers’ wealth
is a crucial factor in their optimal search strategies. Workers with high asset levels choose to
wait until they are matched with a high-paying job because they can endure prolonged unem-
ployment by relying on their savings. On the contrary, low-asset workers choose to apply for
low-paying jobs so that they can get out of unemployment as quickly as possible.
Retraining affects the wage distribution through workers’ job search strategies, asset hold-
ings, and the income tax rate. The opportunity to retrain increases the value of unemployment
by expanding unemployed workers’ choice sets. Higher value of unemployment induces workers
to make bolder choices when they apply for jobs. They choose to apply for higher-paying jobs
at a given asset level. Consequently, wages increase for low-skill workers. Meanwhile, retraining
decreases participants’ asset holdings. Due to the monetary and opportunity costs of retraining,
the participants are likely to hold low levels of assets. That makes them apply for low-paying
jobs, offsetting some of the positive effects of retraining on wages. Moreover, as more work-
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ers end up at the lower end of the wage distribution, the variance of wages increase. Lastly,
retraining increases after-tax wages by reducing the income tax rate. The equilibrium income
tax rate is determined as the ratio of the government spending on unemployment insurance
benefit to the income tax revenue. As more high-skill workers are created through retraining,
the income tax revenue increases, and therefore, the income tax rate decreases.
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy to the NLSY79. The calibrated model matches
the mean retraining rate by age well. The model also does a good job of generating the rise in
retraining between the NLSY79 and NLSY97 cohorts. To see this, I adjust a set of parameters
that capture the changes in the labor market that the NLSY97 cohort experienced such as the
increase in wage premium, the decrease in job finding rates, and the increase in job separation
rates. The model explains around 79 percent of the increase in retraining participation observed
in the data. The changes in job transition rates for low-skill workers play a bigger role than the
changes in wage premium do, implying that grim prospects in the labor market for low-skill
workers are the most important motive to retrain.
Using the model, I make three quantitative contributions. First, I study the effects of
retraining on wage inequality. Since the collapse of middle-wage jobs is considered a primary
source of rising inequality, it is important to understand how retraining affects it. To this end, I
compare the benchmark economy with retraining to a counterfactual economy where retraining
is not possible. I find that in the economy where unemployed workers have a retraining option,
low-skill workers go for higher-paying jobs and as a result, earn higher wages. This decreases
the wage gap between low- and high-skill workers. However, within-skill inequality measured
by wage variance is larger in the benchmark economy for both low- and high-skill workers.
Newly-created high-skill workers tend to have low asset levels since they ran down their savings
while retraining. To avoid extended unemployment, they apply for low-paying jobs, making
the wage distribution more dispersed. Similarly, the variance of wages among low-skill workers
is higher in the benchmark economy since the participants who fail to complete retraining end
up with low-paying jobs.
Second, I investigate the welfare effects of retraining. I assume that the workers in the
benchmark economy are transferred to an economy without retraining and calculate the welfare
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changes. Moving to the economy without retraining makes everyone worse-off. It causes a 1.5%
drop in the average welfare. For high-skill workers, welfare losses come from exclusively from
the income tax increase. For low-skill workers, the income tax increase explains 38% of the total
losses. The losses also come from changes in optimal job search strategies and savings. With a
lack of retraining, low-skill workers take safe job search strategies. Facing a low probability of
unemployment, they are in less need of precautionary savings. It alleviates some of the total
losses. The lost opportunities of upgrade skill accounts for the remaining welfare losses for
low-skill workers.
Lastly, I suggest several government policies that can encourage retraining participation
and evaluate the effectiveness of each policy by comparing their effects on retraining rates and
required tax increases. Universal free retraining results in the highest retraining participation.
However, it comes with a high tax increase. I find that guaranteeing higher unemployment
insurance benefit for retraining participants achieves the biggest increase in retraining rates for
a given tax increase. It is the policy that maximizes the average welfare as well.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, a number of studies such as
Meyer (1995), Heckman et al. (1999), Jacobson et al. (2005a), Jacobson et al. (2011), Nie (2010),
and Barr and Turner (2015) investigate the determinants and consequences of job-training and
education programs for unemployed workers. These studies tend to conduct individual-level
analysis focusing on the effects of retraining on individual re-employment outcomes. Nie (2010)
is the only exception. He develops a structural framework of retraining and uses it to examine
macroeconomic effects of retraining. Specifically, he shows how reforms of retraining programs
in Germany affect aggregate employment, unemployment, and output. This paper is different
from Nie (2010) in that, by incorporating directed search in the model, it takes account of the
effect retraining has on non-participants as well, which allows for a more general welfare and
policy analysis.
From the model perspective, this study is indebted to a growing literature of directed
job search models such as Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011), Menzio et al. (2016), Eeckhout and
Sepahsalari (2014), and Herkenhoff et al. (2016). I contribute to this literature by applying the
theory of directed job search to an important social issue of retraining low-skill workers. The
4
directed job search framework has been used in examining the effects of passive labor market
policies such as unemployment insurance benefits (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999; Chaumont and
Shi, 2017). To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to use this framework to analyze active
labor market policies such as retraining. Lastly, it is also related to an extensive literature on
skill-biased technological change and job polarization. This paper extends this literature by
assessing the potential role of retraining in mitigating the negative consequences of the decline
in middle-wage occupations.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data and empirical results.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses the calibration strategy and the quantitative
analysis, and Section 5 provides the conclusion.
1.2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I present a number of new stylized facts about retraining that will motivate
the setup of my model. Mainly, I look at (a) how prevalent retraining is in the U.S. (b)
what characteristics retraining participants have and, (c) how retraining changes participants’
re-employment wages and occupations later.
1.2.1 Data and Sample Selection
My empirical results are based on both the NLSY79 and NLSY97. The NLSY79 and
NLSY97 are longitudinal studies that follow American youth born between 1957-1964 and
between 1980-1984, respectively. Using both NLSY surveys together provides two advantages.
First, since the NLSY97 only has information on relatively young population, also using the
NLSY79 allows me to observe retraining patterns for older population. Second, since the
NLSY79 survey was made before the decline in the routine occupation had started whereas the
NLSY97 survey was made when it had been ongoing for a while, comparing the two surveys’
population provides some insight into how the decline of routine occupation has impacted
5
retraining participation. Unlike the NLSY79, the NLSY97 doesn’t include the economically
disadvantaged non-black, non-Hispanic oversample and the military sample. To make the
population being studied comparable across two surveys, I exclude these extra samples from
the NLSY79.
I first restrict the sample to those who ever experienced at least one Employment Unem-
ployment Employment transition. To focus on the impact retraining has on low-skill workers,
I exclude those who had a college degree at the beginning of the unemployment spell. I then
define retraining participants as those who enrolled in a 2- or 4-year college during the unem-
ployment spell. The panel structure of the NLSY allows me to find the exact time that a person
lost his job and the time that he started college. A person is considered to have participated
in retraining if he enrolled in a 2- or 4-year college after he had lost his job and before he
had found a new one. The way I define retraining participants is in line with the fact that
much of retraining programs for unemployed workers in the U.S. takes place in the form of
regular college courses (Jacobson et al., 2005a).1 Besides, looking at college programs rather
than particular job training programs is most suited for the purpose of the study since most
highly demanded jobs require a college degree.
One concern about the way I define retraining participants is that with the information
available in the NLSY surveys, it is difficult to perfectly distinguish retraining participants
from those who are simply putting off going to college. However, this problem doesn’t seem
critical. The youngest group in the sample is 23 years old, the age at which most people finish
college education. Plus, the workers in the sample have the average of about 5 years of full-time
working experience prior to unemployment. So, it’s reasonable to assume that they are different
than those who take one or two gap years for some experience before starting college.
The data is at the unemployment spell level. There are a total of 11,981 spells for a total
of 4,347 individuals in the NLSY79, and a total of 5,050 spells for 2,610 individuals in the
1Public-sponsored retraining in the U.S. for unemployed workers is provided through the Workforce Invest-
ment Act. Unemployed workers can receive three tiers of services: core services (e.g. job search assistance),
intensive services (e.g. comprehensive assessment, case management), and training (e.g. classroom training, on-
the-job training). Workers who reach the training level of services are given a voucher referred to as Individual
Training Accounts, which they can use to obtain retraining from certified providers, most of which are 2-year
public colleges. (Eberts, 2010; Frank and Minoff, 2005)
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NLSY97.
1.2.2 Incidence of Retraining
Figure 1 plots the fraction of retraining participants among the unemployed by age. The top
panel plots the results from the NLSY79, and the bottom panel from the NLSY97. Retraining
rates decrease along age, which is not surprising since older workers have fewer working years
left to enjoy the rewards of retraining. The figure also shows that there has been a big increase
in retraining for the younger cohorts. At the age of 23, only 2.2% of unemployed workers
retrained in the NLSY79. The number increases to 10.8% among the NLSY97 cohorts.2 I
discuss the sources of this increase in the later part of the paper.
Note: This figure presents the share of retraining participants among the unemployed at each age.
The left figure is from the NLSY79 and the right figure the NLSY97.
Figure 1: Retraining rates by age
2To my knowledge, Barr and Turner (2015) is the only recent study on prevalence of retraining. Using the
CPS, they found 13 % of unemployed individuals aged 20-30 were enrolled in college between 2008 and 2011, and
from the SIPP, they found between 15 and 20% of UI recipients aged 20-30 enrolled within 6 months of initial
UI receipt over a similar period. Their numbers are bigger than what I found possibly because the definition of
retraining participants I used is more restrictive.
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1.2.3 Characteristics of Retraining Participants
Table 1 compares basic summary statistics between retraining participants and non partic-
ipants. Retraining participants are slightly younger, more likely to be female, more likely to
be black, less likely to be Hispanic, and less likely to be married. These findings are consistent
with what Barr and Turner (2015) found from the CPS. Retraining participants also have a
higher cognitive ability measured by Armed Forces Qualifications Test score (AFQT).
I found no significant differences between the two groups in the net value of total assets
they hold and hourly wages they used to earn pre-unemployment. Since there are more young
people, females, and minorities among retraining participants, I compared asset holdings and
previous wages adjusted for the effects of age, sex, race, marital status, and AFQT scores.
The results show that retraining participants have higher residual assets. The difference is
significant at the 10% significance level. Figure 2 gives a closer look on the relation between
asset holdings and retraining. The figure plots retraining rates over the distribution of residual
total assets. The fraction of retraining participants among the unemployed increases as assets
percentile increases. In the high end of the asset distribution, however, the fraction flattens
then slightly decreases.
8
Note: This figure plots retraining rates over the residual asset distribution. The left figure is from
the NLSY79 and the right figure the NLSY97.
Figure 2: Retraining rates by asset percentile
Unemployed workers’ previous occupations can affect their retraining participation as well.
Those who previously worked in the occupations where higher-education is rewarded more
(e.g. non-routine cognitive occupation) may have a stronger incentive to retrain. On the
other hand, those who worked in the occupations in decline (e.g. routine occupation) may
want to retrain more so that they can move to the occupations in expansion. Following the
literature (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; David and Dorn, 2013; Cortes et al., 2014, 2017), I
classify workers’ previous occupations into four groups: non-routine cognitive, non-routine
manual, routine cognitive, routine manual3. I then compare the share of each occupation group
between retraining participants and non-participants. Since the share of women, who have a
higher participation rate than men, varies across occupations, I do this analysis separately by
3The occupation is considered routine if the tasks can be done by following well-defined instructions. The
occupation is considered non-routine if it involves tasks that require flexibility, creativity, problem-solving, or
human interaction. Cognitive and manual occupations are distinguished by the relative extent of mental to phys-
ical activity. Non-routine cognitive occupations include Professional, Managerial and Technical Occupations.
Routine cognitive occupations include Sales and Clerical Occupations. Routine manual occupations include
Production, Craft and Repair Occupations, Operators, and Transportation and Material Moving Occupations.
Non-routine manual occupations include Service Occupations.(Cortes et al., 2017)
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sex. The results are reported in Table 2. For women, I find no significant differences in previous
occupations between retraining participants and non-participants. For men, however, retraining
participants have a higher fraction of former non-routine manual workers and a lower fraction
of former routine-manual workers. This suggests that low retraining participation among men
stems from low participation among former routine-manual workers, despite the fact that it
is the occupation most vulnerable to automation and international trade and, therefore, its
workers need retraining the most.
A. Male Non-participants Participants
Percent non-routine cognitive 19.6 19.3
Percent non-routine manual 21.0 29.5 ***
Percent routine cognitive 27.0 26.7
Percent routine manual 32.3 24.4 **
B. Female Non-participants Participants
Percent non-routine cognitive 30.5 30.8
Percent non-routine manual 20.9 23.9
Percent routine cognitive 41.9 38.4
Percent routine manual 6.8 6.9
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%
The corresponding table for the NLSY79 can be found in Table 27.
Source: NLSY97.
Table 2: Occupation by sex (participants vs. non-participants)
1.2.4 Outcomes of Retraining
In this section, I examine the outcomes of participating in retraining. Before doing this,
I first see how many retraining participants successfully complete retraining. I compute the
fraction of retraining participants who earn either an Associate’s degree or a Bachelor’s degree
by years from the beginning of the unemployment spell. The success rate of retraining is quite
low. As shown in Table 3, after 4 years from the start of unemployment, only about 33 percent
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of retraining participants hold an Associate’s or Bachelor’s degree. After 6 years, the number
increases to about 42 percent. Only just less than a half were able to get a college degree as
a result of retraining. This finding is consistent with that non-traditional students who are
usually older than traditional students have higher college dropout rates than others.
Percent holding a college degree
t+4 32.92
t+5 38.14
t+6 42.24
Note: t is the time when a sample lost his job
Source: NLSY97.
Table 3: Retraining completion rates
1.2.4.1 Occupation Switching Patterns I begin by comparing the occupation switching
patterns among unemployed workers. I see if participating in retraining affects the probability
of a worker moving to a higher-ranked job in the job ladder. Again, I use the occupation
classification of Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Ranked by occupational mean wage, non-routine
cognitive occupations are in the top, non-routine manual occupations are in the bottom, and
routine occupations are in the middle. Figures 3-5 show the share of workers re-employed
in each occupation group. The share of workers re-employed in the non-routine cognitive
occupation, the highest ranked group, is higher for participants than non-participants. The
share re-employed in the routine occupation, which has been in decline for the past couple of
decades, is lower among the participants. The share in the non-routine manual occupation,
the lowest ranked group, is also lower for participants. However, the results for retraining
participants who fail to get a college degree aren’t very different from those for non-participants.
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Note: This figure presents the share of workers who work in non-routine cognitive occupations. The
horizontal axis shows years after the job loss.
Figure 3: Fraction in non-routine cognitive occupations
Note: This figure presents the share of workers who work in routine occupations. The horizontal
axis shows years after the job loss.
Figure 4: Fraction in routine occupations
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Note: This figure presents the share of workers who work in non-routine manual occupations. The
horizontal axis shows years after the job loss.
Figure 5: Fraction in non-routine manual workers
I also classify the sample according to the direction of the switches. The results are pre-
sented in Figures 6-8. The share of workers who switched to higher-ranked occupations (e.g.
from routine to non-routine cognitive, from non-routine manual to routine/non-routine cogni-
tive) is higher for participants. Both the share of stayers and the share of those who moved
down the ladder (e.g from non-routine cognitive to routine/non-routine manual, from routine to
non-routine manual) are lower among participants. In the NLSY97, the fraction moving down
is actually higher for participants at the time they would have just finished retraining, but it
decreases as time passes and becomes lower than non-participants eventually. Overall, retrain-
ing participants have a better chance of finding a better job when they are re-employed than
non-participants. It is not the case, though, for those who stop retraining without a degree.
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Note: This figure presents the share of workers who moved up the job ladder (e.g., workers who
switched from routine occupations to non-routine cognitive occupations). The horizontal axis shows
years after the job loss.
Figure 6: Fraction of workers who moved up the job ladder
Note: This figure presents the share of workers who went back to the occupation they had held prior
to unemployment. The horizontal axis shows years after the job loss.
Figure 7: Fraction of workers who stayed in the same occupation group
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Note: This figure presents the share of workers who moved down the job ladder (e.g., workers who
switched from non-routine cognitive occupations to routine occupations). The horizontal axis shows
years after the job loss.
Figure 8: Fraction of workers who moved down the job ladders
1.2.4.2 Wage Changes Now I turn my interest to the effects of retraining on wage changes.
Figure 9 compares wage changes between participants and non-participants. After 4 years from
the beginning of unemployment, wages of retraining participants are only slightly higher than
those of non-participants. This is closely related to the fact that the share of individuals
who switch occupations is higher among participants. Those who switch occupations tend
to start with low wages since they have to start over in a new field where they don’t have
much experience. Plus, while participants are studying at school, non-participants can keep
working, which increase their tenure and in turn, their wages. However, as I showed in the
previous section, retraining participants are more likely to work in the non-routine cognitive
occupation where the average wage grows more quickly. This is reflected in their wage changes.
Wages of participants increase faster with time, making the gap between participants and non-
participants wider. Comparing the NLSY79 and 97, wage changes are biggest among recent
cohorts, reflecting increased skill and occupation premium.
16
Note: This figure compares wage changes between retraining participants and non-participants.
The vertical axis presents changes in real wages compared to workers’ most recent wages prior to
unemployment. The horizontal axis shows years after the job loss.
Figure 9: Wage changes
1.3 Model
Time is discrete and lasts forever. There is a unit measure of risk-averse finitely-lived
workers. Each worker lives T ≥ 2 periods deterministically, thus there are T overlapping
generations in the economy. A worker’s utility in each period is u(c) + Lη + ψ1{retraining=1}.
c is consumption. The function u satisfies u′(c) ≥ 0 and u′′(c) < 0. η is the utility from
leisure where  denotes the worker’s employment status. ψ is workers’ preference for studying.
This preference parameter captures factors not explicitly modeled here that may affect their
retraining participation, such as their learning ability. Workers discount the future at a rate
β ∈ (0, 1) and accumulate non-contingent assets denoted as a ∈ A = [a, a] ⊂ R. The net rate
of return on assets r is taken as given.
Workers are born with skill s ∈ {l, h}. Workers born with h represent those who enter
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the labor market with a college degree, whereas workers born with l represent those who start
their careers with only a high-school diploma. In each period, workers with skill s are either
employed or unemployed, where the employed value function is denoted Es and unemployed
value function is denoted U s. Employed workers spend 1 − Le amount of time working and
receive wage w each period. They pay a fraction of their wage τw as income tax. Unemployed
workers spend 1 − Lu searching for jobs and receive unemployment insurance benefit b > 0,
which expires every period with the probability χ. Once they lose their benefit, they can’t
receive it again during the same unemployment spell.
There is a continuum of risk neutral firms. Firms belong to either the routine occupation
group (denoted by R) or the non-routine cognitive occupation group (denoted by CG). Match-
ing between a skill-s worker and a occupation-j firm produces yjs units of output. I assume
skill-h workers produce more than skill-l workers and occupation-CG firms produce more than
occupation-R firms. Therefore, yCG,h > yR,h > yCG,l > yR,l. Matching between skill and oc-
cupation is determined exogenously. Skill-s workers meet with occupation-CG firms with the
probability ps. Skill-h workers have a higher chance to be matched with occupation-CG firms
than skill-l workers (ph > pl). Each period, firms post a vacancy at cost κjs. When posting a
vacancy, firms offer a contract that specifies the piece-rate of output µ ∈ [0, 1] that is paid as
wages. A contract is not renegotiable, fixing µ until the match breaks. For simplicity, I assume
there is no on-the-job search. The only way to break an existing match is exogenous separation,
which happens every period with the occupation and skill-specific probability δjs.
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The labor market consists of a continuum of submarkets indexed by worker age t, skill s,
occupation j, and the piece-rate µ. Each submarket (t, s, j, µ) has its own tightness θt(s, j, µ),
which is defined as the ratio of vacancies to job applicants. The matching process in each sub-
market is governed by a constant returns to scale matching function M(u(t, s, j, µ), v(t, s, j, µ)).
Workers’ job finding rates are defined as:
m(θt(s, j, µ)) =
M(u(t, s, j, µ), v(t, s, j, µ))
u(t, s, j, µ)
As θt(s, j, µ) increases, it becomes easier for workers to find the employer, thus m
′(θt(s, j, µ)) >
0. Firms’ hiring rates are given as:
q(θt(s, j, µ)) =
M(u(t, s, j, µ), v(t, s, j, µ))
v(t, s, j, µ)
It becomes harder for firms to find the employee as θ increases, therefore q′(θt(s, j, µ)) < 0. In
each labor market, the free entry condition determines the measure of firms. In each period,
unemployed workers choose the submarket in which they search for jobs by comparing the wage
w(θt(s, j, µ)) = µyjs and the probability they get hired m(θt(s, j, µ)).
Low-skill workers can upgrade their skills through retraining. If a skill-l worker is partic-
ipating in retraining, his value function is scripted with a R, and if not, scripted with a NR.
At the beginning of each period, skill-l unemployed workers decide whether they participate
in retraining or not by comparing U l,NR and U l,R. If they decide to participate, they spend
1−Lr amount of time in retraining for z periods. Retraining requires financial and opportunity
costs. Participants pay tuition every period, and they are not allowed to work while retrain-
ing. I assume participants are still eligible for insurance benefits.4 The retraining process is
stochastic. In each period, participants face a dropout risk. They stop retraining with the
probability of λ ∈ [0, 1]. Once completing retraining without dropping out, they become skill-h
workers, in which case they experience higher wages and higher chances to be matched with a
occupation-CG firm.
The government provides unemployed workers with insurance benefits and subsidizes their
4In the U.S., unemployment insurance beneficiaries are allowed to enroll in college or job skills training while
also receiving benefits as long as they enroll in approved programs (Barr and Turner (2015).)
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retraining. ρ fraction of tuition ν is paid by the government. The government finances the
retraining costs and insurance benefits by imposing income taxes on employed workers.
In each period, the timeline is given as follows: (1) Existing matches produce and workers
are paid. Unemployed workers receive their insurance benefit. (2) Unemployed workers decide
whether to participate in retraining or not. (3) Workers choose optimal consumption and
saving. (4) Unemployed workers who are not participating retraining choose the submarket in
which they search for jobs, and new matches are created. They don’t start to produce until
the next period. (5) A fraction δj of existing matches is separated. Newly formed matches are
excluded in this exogenous separation process. (6) A fraction λ of trainees drop out. (7) A
fraction χ of unemployed workers lose their unemployment insurance benefit.
1.3.1 Unemployed Workers
In this section, I describe the problem of low-skill unemployed workers. Low-skill unem-
ployed workers decide whether they participate in retraining or search for a job at the beginning
of each period. They face a different problem according to their decisions. I describe retraining
participants’ and non-participants’ problems, and unemployed workers’ retraining decisions.
1.3.1.1 Retraining Participants The problem of retraining participants is given below:
U l,Rt (a, b, ψ, j, z) = max
a′
u(c, Lr, ψ) + λβ[χU
l,NR
t+1 (a
′, 0, ψ, j) + (1− χ)U l,NRt+1 (a′, b, ψ, j)]
+ (1− λ)β[χU l,Rt+1(a′, 0, ψ, j, z′) + (1− χ)U l,Rt+1(a′, b, ψ, j, z′)], t ≤ T (1.1)
U l,RT+1(a, b, ψ, j, z) = 0
s.t c+ a′ + (1− ρ)ν = (1 + r)a+ b
a′ ≥ a
z = [z1, z2, · · · , z] denotes semesters. At each period, retraining participants choose optimal
consumption and saving (c and a′), receive insurance benefit b, and pay tuition (1− ρ)ν where
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ρ is the share of tuition paid by the government. Their current utility depends on consumption
c, leisure Lr and their preference for studying ψ. In the next period, they drop out with the
probability of λ, in which case they fail to upgrade their skills. It is not allowed that retraining
participants come back to school at the same period they drop out. With the probability of
1− λ, they go on to the next semester z′ and continue retraining.
Each period, χ fraction of benefit recipients lose their benefit. The problem of those who
have already lost their benefit is given below:
U l,Rt (a, 0, ψ, j, z) = max
a′
u(c, Lr, ψ) + λβU
l,NR
t+1 (a
′, 0, ψ, j)
+ (1− λ)βU l,Rt+1(a′, 0, ψ, j, z′), t ≤ T (1.2)
U l,RT+1(a, 0, ψ, j, z) = 0
s.t c+ a′ + (1− ρ)ν = (1 + r)a+ bmin
a′ ≥ a
where bmin is home production that prevents negative consumption.
The value function of retraining participants takes a different form in the last semester
(z = z). The problem is given below:
U l,Rt (a, b, ψ, j, z) = max
a′
u(c, Lr, ψ) + λβ[χU
l,NR
t+1 (a
′, 0, ψ, j) + (1− χ)U l,NRt+1 (a′, b, ψ, j)]
+ (1− λ)βχ[phUht+1(a′, 0, CG) + (1− ph)Uht+1(a′, 0, R)]
+ (1− λ)β(1− χ)[phUht+1(a′, b, CG) + (1− ph)Uht+1(a′, b, R)], t ≤ T (1.3)
U l,RT+1(a, b, ψ, j, z) = 0
s.t c+ a′ + (1− ρ)ν = (1 + r)a+ b
a′ ≥ a
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Retraining participants leave school and go on to the labor market in the next period. But
with the probability of λ, they fail to complete retraining and search for jobs as low-skilled
in the occupation group to which they belonged before they had started retraining. With the
probability of 1 − λ, they finish retraining with a degree and search for jobs as high-skilled.
Those who successfully complete retraining can either search in occupation-CG or occupation-
R. It is not guaranteed for them to go into sector-CG, but they have a higher chance to do
that. ph denotes the probability that a skill-h worker searches in occupation-CG.
1.3.1.2 Non-participants The value function of skill-l unemployed workers who are not
participating in retraining is given as:
U l,NRt (a, b, ψ, j) = max
a′
u(c, Lu) + χβ[max
µ′
m(θt+1(l, j, µ
′))Elt+1(a
′, µ′, ψ, j)
+ (1−m(θt+1(l, j, µ′)))U lt+1(a′, 0, ψ, j)] + (1− χ)β[max
µ′
m(θt+1(l, j, µ
′))Elt+1(a
′, µ′, ψ, j)
+ (1−m(θt+1(l, j, µ′)))U lt+1(a′, b, ψ, j)], t ≤ T (1.4)
U l,NRT+1 (a, b, ψ, j) = 0
s.t c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+ b and a′ ≥ a
Their utility depends on consumption c and leisure Lu. Besides optimal savings a
′, workers
choose labor markets in which they search for jobs. Since j is determined exogenously, they
only choose µ′, the contract between a firm and a worker on what fraction of production the
worker takes. Choosing µ′, they are hired with the probability of m(θ(l, j, µ′)), in which case,
they get paid w(θ(l, j, µ′)). As mentioned earlier, there exists an inverse relation between
m(θ(l, j, µ′)) and w(θ(l, j, µ′)) at the equilibrium.
Skill-l unemployed workers make a retraining decision at the beginning of every period:
U lt(a, b, ψ, j) = max
{
U l,Rt (a, b, ψ, j, z1), U
l,NR
t (a, b, ψ, j)
}
(1.5)
Let Dt(a, b, ψ, j) denote the worker’s retraining decision. Dt(a, b, ψ, j) = 1 when the value of
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retraining is larger than the value of staying low-skilled (U l,Rt (a, b, ψ, j, z1) > U
l,NR
t (a, b, ψ, j)).
1.3.2 Employed Workers
The value function of employed workers is given below:
Elt(a, µ, ψ, j) = max
a′
u(c, Le) + β[δjsU
l
t+1(a
′, b, ψ, j) + (1− δjs)Elt+1(a′, µ, ψ, j)] (1.6)
ElT+1(a, µ, ψ, j) = 0
s.t c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+ (1− τ)w(θt(l, j, µ)) and a′ ≥ a
Employed workers’ current utility depends on consumption c and leisure Le. They choose
optimal consumption c and saving a′, get paid labor income w(θt(l, j, µ)), and pay income tax
τw(θt(l, j, µ)). In the next period, with probability δjs, they separate from the firm they are
currently working for. For simplicity, I assume there is no on-the-job search, and employed
workers don’t participate in retraining.
The value functions for skill-h workers are included in the Appendix.
1.3.3 Firms
In each labor market (t, s, j, µ), there’s a continuum of firms. Each firm hires a single
worker. Firms post a vacancy with a contract that specifies a piece-rate µ of production they
pay to their workers. Contracts are renegotiation-proof. An occupation-j firm that hires a
skill-s worker produces yjs units of output, which represent the matching quality between the
firm and the worker. The firm retains a fraction (1− µ) of the output and pays the rest to the
worker. There’s no on-the-job search, but the match can break exogenously. The probability
that a match between skill-s workers and occupation-j firms exogenously breaks is δjs The value
function for firms is given as:
Jt(s, j, µ) = (1− µ)yjs + β(1− δjs)Jt+1(s, j, µ), t ≤ T (1.7)
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JT+1(s, j, µ) = 0
The free entry condition holds for each submarket (t, s, j, µ). The occupation and skill-
specific cost of posting a vacancy, κjs, is equal to the expected benefit of posting a vacancy.
This yields:
κjs = q(θt(s, j, µ))Jt(s, j, µ) (1.8)
In equilibrium, equation (7) and (8) together yield the market tightness in each submarket:
θt(s, j, µ) = q
−1(
κjs
Jt(s, j, µ)
) (1.9)
1.3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is a set of policy functions for workers {c, a′, µ′, D}, value
functions for workers U st , U
l,NR
t , U
l,R
t , E
s
t , value functions for firms Jt, a market tightness function
θt(s, j, µ), an income tax rate τ , and the economy’s density function f . These functions satisfy
the following:
1. The policy functions solve the workers problems with associated value functions.
2. The free entry condition holds.
3. The total income tax revenue equals the summation of the total amount of unemployment
insurance benefit and tuition subsidy
4. The distribution of workers across state is consistent with workers’ policy functions.
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1.4 Quantitative Analysis
1.4.1 Calibration
In this section, I discuss the parameterization of the model. I divide the model parameters
into three groups. For the first set of parameters, I either borrow values from other literature
or use standard values. The values of the second set of parameters are chosen directly to match
their counterparts in the data. The third set of parameters are jointly calibrated to the U.S.
data, to the cohort born 1957-1964. A list of parameters included in each group are summarized
in Table 4 and 5.
Parameter Value Description Source
T 140 Life span Standard
r 0.012 Risk free rate Annual rate ≈ 5%
β 0.988 Discount factor 1/(1+r)
σ 2 Risk aversion Standard
a -2 Debt limit Non-binding borrowing constraint
η 0.237 Flow utility of leisure Herkenhoff et al. (2016)
Le 0.875 Time spent working Albanesi and Sahin (2018)
Lu 0.375 Time spent job searching Albanesi and Sahin (2018)
ζ 0.5 Matching efficiency Shi (2016)
δCG,h 0.02 Separation rate at occupation-CG for skill-h CPS (1983-39)
δCG,l 0.034 Separation rate at occupation-CG for skill-l CPS (1983-39)
δR,h 0.034 Separation rate at occupation-R for skill-h CPS (1983-39)
δR,l 0.061 Separation rate at occupation-R for skill-l CPS (1983-39)
λ 0.08 College dropout rate NLSY97
ph 0.7347 Prob that a type-h works at the NRCG occupation CPS (1983-89)
pl 0.2183 Prob that a type-l works at the NRCG occupation CPS (1983-89)
Mh 0.2508 Fraction born as type-h CPS (1983-89)
b 0.32 UI benefit Benefit income ratio ≈ 40%
χ 0.788 UI benefit expiration rate Expected UI duration ≈ 26 weeks
Table 4: Independently chosen model parameters
The length of a period is calibrated to a quarter, and the model age zero corresponds to
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age 18 in the data. The workers leave the model at the model age of 140. All workers enter
the model unemployed and with zero assets. I assume a quarterly interest rate equal to 1.2%,
which yields an annual rate of 5%. Workers are born as either skill-l or skill-h. The fraction
born as skill-h, Mh, is set to the share of college graduates at age 23 in the Current Population
Survey (CPS). Unemployed workers search for jobs either in occupation-CG or occupation-
R. The fraction of skill-s workers who search in occupation-CG, ps, is chosen to match the
share of each skill type (college graduates or high-school graduates) in the non-routine cognitive
occupation calculated from the CPS.
Parameter Value Description
yCG,h 1.39 Matching quality between occupation-CG and skill-h
yR,h 1.156 Matching quality between occupation-R and skill-h
yCG,l 1.128 Matching quality between occupation-CG and skill-l
yR,l 1 Matching quality between occupation-R and skill-l
κCG,h 0.6481 Vacancy posting cost at occupation-CG for skill-h
κR,h 0.3104 Vacancy posting cost at occupation-R for skill-h
κCG,l 0.3932 Vacancy posting cost at occupation-CG for skill-l
κR,l 0.2772 Vacancy posting cost at occupation-R for skill-l
ψµ 0.2701 Scale parameter in the preference distribution
ν 0.092 Tuition
Table 5: Jointly-calibrated parameters
Preferences for workers at a given period are given below:
u(c, L, ψ) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ + η(1− L) + ψ1{retraining=1}, where  = e, r, u (1.10)
The discount factor, β, is set to 0.988 so that β = 1/(1 + r). The risk aversion parameter, σ,
is set to a standard value, 2.
The utility from leisure, η, is set to 0.237 following Herkenhoff et al. (2016). Le is set to
0.625 (10 hours of work out of 16 active hours) and Lu to 0.125 (2 hours of job searching for jobs
out of 16 active hours) following Albanesi and S¸ahin (2018) and Krueger and Mueller (2012).
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I assume that retraining participants spend as much time at school as employed workers spend
at work. Thus, Lr = Le.
The utility from studying, ψ, is 6 evenly spaced grid points over [0.6,1.4]. Low-skill workers
are born with a draw over this grid. The drawing process follows the exponential distribution,
and the scale parameter of the distribution, ψµ, is calibrated to match the mean retraining rate
from the NLSY79.
The unemployment insurance benefit b is chosen so that it replaces about 40% of prior
earnings. The income tax rate, τ , is set to the value that makes the government’s budget
balance. The benefit expiration rate, χ, is chosen so that the expected duration of eligibility
is approximately 26 weeks. Home production, bmin, when the benefit is not available, is set to
the value that prevents negative consumption.
The occupation and skill-specific production, yjs, is calibrated to match the college premium
in each occupation and the non-routine cognitive premium among each education group. The
premiums are obtained from the CPS.
To assign values to δjs, the occupation and skill-specific job separation rate, and κjs, the
occupation and skill-specific job posting cost, I calculated the gross worker flows from the CPS
using its panel structure. The CPS surveys the same household 4 months consecutively, skip 8
months, and then re-surveys for another 4 months. I restricted the sample to the households
that are surveyed for the first time and the households that just come back to the survey after
the break so that I can observe their employment status three months later. I calculated the
quarterly job separation rate in occupation-j for skill-s workers as the fraction of employed skill-
s workers in occupation-j who became unemployed three month later. I assign these values to
δjs in the model. Similarly, I calculated the quarterly job finding rate in occupation-j for skill-s
workers as the fraction of unemployed skill-s workers who previously held a occupation-j job
and became employed three months later. κjs is calibrated to match these values.
Retraining takes 9 model periods (3 years assuming participants spend 3 quarters per year
at school). The dropout rate, λ, is chosen to match the retraining completion rate from the
NLSY97. The tuition, ν, is chosen to match the tuition in the data as a ratio of the average
wages. To calculate the tuition-income ratio, I use in-state tuition data from the National
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Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and the average annual income among high-school
graduates from the CPS. The tuition subsidy, ρ, is set to zero in the benchmark calibration
since public-sponsored retraining programs are very limited.5 In the later part of the paper, I
adjust this parameter to examine the effects of subsidizing retraining.
I use a constant returns to scale matching function that yields well-defined probabilities
following Schaal (2012):
M(u, v) =
uv
(vζ + uζ)
1
ζ
(1.11)
The firms’ hiring rates are given by q(θt(s, j, µ)) =
M(ut(t,s,j,µ),vt(t,s,j,µ))
vt(t,s,j,µ)
, and the workers’ job
finding rates are given by m(θt(t, s, j, µ)) =
M(ut(t,s,j,µ),vt(t,s,j,µ))
ut(t,s,j,µ)
. The matching elasticity, ζ, is
set to 0.5 as in Shi (2016).
1.4.2 Model Performance
Table 6 compares targeted moments between the model and the data. The statistics gener-
ated by the model are very close to those obtained from the data. Figure 10 graphically shows
the model prediction of retraining rates by age. The model replicates retraining rates in the
NLSY79 well for younger population but underpredicts retraining rates for older population.
One possible explanation is that the model only takes account of economic aspects of retraining
whereas in reality, people decide to go back to school for other reasons such as in search for a
sense of accomplishment or the pure joy of learning. Such non-economic motivations can play
a more important role in explaining older workers’ retraining participation because a college
degree may not be worthwhile for them in terms of career advancement.
5The Workforce Investment Act was introduced in 1998. Public-sponsored retraining before 1998 was pro-
vided through Job Training Partnership Act, which focused more on supporting the economically disadvantaged
than retraining unemployed workers (Jacobson et al., 2005b). Even with WIA, public-sponsored retraining is
limited. The sequential nature of the program may mean that not many unemployed workers never reach the
training level of services(Frank and Minoff, 2005).
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Model Target Source
Skill premium in occupation-CG 28.21% 28.42% CPS (1983-89)
Skill premium in occupation-R 25.60% 25.80% CPS (1983-89)
occupation premium for skill-h 23.22% 19.37% CPS (1983-89)
occupation premium for skill-l 20.72% 19% CPS (1983-89)
Job finding rates at occupation-R for skill-l 44.31 % 45.14% CPS (1983-89)
Job finding rates at occupation-R for skill-h 48.64% 48.94% CPS (1983-89)
Job finding rates at occupation-CG for skill-l 47.97% 48.69% CPS (1983-89)
Job finding rates at occupation-CG for skill-h 45.22% 44.93% CPS (1983-89)
Tuition-income ratio 9.97% 10.81% NCES, CPS (1983-89)
UI benefit-income ratio 39.88% 40% Standard
Retraining population (23-33) 1.66% 1.66% NLSY79
Table 6: Targeted moments
In the empirical analysis section, I documented that the NLSY97 cohorts have a considerably
higher retraining rate than the NLSY79 cohorts. As a further test of the calibration, I see if the
model can replicate this. I compare retraining rates of two groups of workers who face different
labor markets in terms of wage premium and job transition rates. One group is thrown into a
similar labor market that the NLSY79 cohorts (born 1957-1964) experienced when they were
young workers. The other group is given the labor market conditions that the NLSY97 cohorts
(born 1980-1984) faced early in their career.
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Figure 10: Model fit
The NLSY79 and NLSY97 cohorts have quite different labor market experiences. Table 7
compares some of the labor market characteristics that the two cohorts faced. The younger co-
horts enjoyed a higher college premium and a higher non-routine cognitive occupation premium.
However, they also suffered a worse labor market, featured as a lower job finding rate and a
higher job separation rate. This is more prominent among low-skill workers. Some of it has to
do with the fact that the economy has not yet fully recovered from the great recession when the
younger cohort started their career. However, the fact that low-skill workers suffered a bigger
drop in the job finding rate and a bigger rise in the job separation rate than high-skill workers
reflects the gradual decline of routine jobs in the U.S. caused by automation and international
trade.
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1957-1964 cohorts 1980-1984 cohorts
College premium (occupation-CG) 28.42% 43.29%
College premium (occupation-R) 25.80% 36.09%
occupation premium (skill-h) 19.37% 30.78%
occupation premium (skill-l) 19% 24.38%
Job finding rates (occupation-CG & skill-h) 44.93% 35.28%
Job finding rates (occupation-CG & skill-l) 48.69% 28.49%
Job finding rates (occupation-R & skill-h) 48.93% 35.92%
Job finding rates (occupation-R & skill-l) 45.14% 28.15%
Job separation rates (occupation-CG & skill-h) 2% 2.9%
Job separation rates (occupation-CG & skill-l) 3.4% 4.68%
Job separation rates (occupation-R & skill-h) 3.4% 4.28%
Job separation rates (occupation-R & skill-l) 6.1% 6.89%
Tuition/Income 10.81% 27.02%
Share of college graduates at age 23 25.08% 36.65%
Note: Tuition includes tuition and required fee, averaged between four-year and two-year colleges.
Income is the average annual income among high-school graduates.
Source: CPS
Table 7: Comparison of labor market characteristics between two cohorts
The benchmark calibration features the labor market for the older cohort. Starting from
there, I generate changes in the labor market characteristics that I observed in the data and see
the resulting effects on retraining. I adjust matching quality differences across skill-occupation
pairs (yjs) to reflect the rise of the skill and cognitive occupation premium. The substantial
growth of these premiums increases benefits of retraining. In addition, I change parameters
associated with job transition rates to match disproportionate changes in job finding and sep-
aration rates across skill-occupation pairs. Specifically, I adjust δjs to match occupation and
skill-specific job separation rates. I then vary κjs, the vacancy posting cost, to match occupation
and skill-specific job finding rates. Compared to the older cohort, the younger cohort, notably
those without college education, faced a lower job finding rate and a higher job separation rate.
These changes in job transition rates give low-skill workers another reason to retrain: career
prospects without retraining look dim. I also vary tuition (ν) and the fraction of workers born
as high-skill (Mh). It is well known that college tuition in the U.S. has risen significantly, and
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this increases the cost of retraining. I change the initial skill distribution as well to reflect the
fact that the number of individuals who go straight to college from high school is higher among
the younger cohort.
In the data I observe a higher retraining rate for the younger cohort than for the older
cohort. Retraining rates among the younger cohort is about 6.52 percent compared to 1.66
percent among the older cohort. Adjusting for the labor-market related parameters mentioned
above, the model yields retraining rates of 5.51 percent, predicting about 79 percent of the
difference in retraining participation between the two cohorts observed in the data.
To further investigate the sources of higher participation in retraining among the younger
cohort, I decompose the difference in retraining rates between the two cohorts into the contribu-
tions of each change in the labor market. To this end, I adjust one set of parameters at a time.
For example, to see the contribution of wage premium, I adjust yjs to the values associated
with the younger cohort with the rest of the parameters fixed at the level associated with the
older cohort. Tuition and initial skill distribution are fixed at the level of the younger cohort.
Table 8 presents the results. The decrease of job finding rates for low-skill workers cause the
largest rise in retraining. The increase of skill and occupation premium generates the second-
largest rise. These results suggest that low-skill workers retrain not only to get paid more but
also to escape from the occupation in decline. There are factors that curb retraining as well.
The increase of job separation rates for low-skill workers causes a modest decline in retraining.
The decrease of job finding rates and the increase of job separation rates for high-skill workers
decrease retraining by reducing the benefit of being high-skilled.
32
Retraining population (%)
1957-1964 cohorts 1980-1984 cohorts Differences(pp)
Data 1.66 6.52 4.86
Model: all 1.66 5.51 3.85
Model: skill and occupation premium only 1.66 3.11 1.44
Model: job finding rates (High-skill) only 1.66 0 -1.66
Model: job finding rates (Low-skill) only 1.66 6.56 4.9
Model: separation rates (High-skill) only 1.66 0 -1.66
Model: separation rates (Low-skill) only 1.66 0.34 -1.32
Note: Tuition and the fraction born as high-skill are set to match the level for the younger cohort.
Table 8: Retraining rates, in the data and as predicted by the calibrated model
1.4.3 Counterfactual
In this section, I examine the aggregate effects of retraining on economy. I compare the
benchmark economy to a counterfactual economy where retraining is not possible and see how
retraining affects wage inequality and welfare.
1.4.3.1 Retraining and Wage Inequality First, I look into the relationship between
retraining and wage inequality. Retraining affects wage inequality by changing workers’ optimal
search strategies. In my model, unemployed workers face a trade-off between high wages and
high job finding rates when they decide which jobs to apply for. In general, wealthy workers
apply for high-paying but hard to obtain jobs since their wealth allows them to endure a
longer unemployment duration. Retraining intervenes in this process by increasing the value
of unemployment. The possibility of retraining makes unemployment less painful by giving
unemployed workers one more option. This enables unemployed workers to make bolder choices
when they apply for jobs. As a result, unemployed workers apply for higher-paying jobs at
a given amount of assets. Figure 11 presents low-skill unemployed workers’ job application
strategies by assets. The vertical axis represents job quality. The higher the number, the higher
the wage and the lower the job finding rate. It shows that there exists a positive correlation
between asset holdings and job quality, consistent with Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2014) and
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Chaumont and Shi (2017). It also shows that, at a given level of assets, workers apply for better
jobs in the benchmark economy where retraining is possible than they do in the counterfactual
economy where there is no retraining.
Note: This figure plots low-skill unemployed workers’ optimal job search strategies by asset holdings
(left) and by age (right). Higher numbers in the vertical axis represent higher-paying, harder to
obtain jobs. The solid line shows job search strategies of the model with retraining. The dashed line
shows job search strategies of the model without retraining.
Figure 11: Job search strategies
This interaction between retraining and directed job search affects unemployed workers’ re-
employment wages. Table 9 compares the mean model wage among three different economies:
the benchmark economy, a counterfactual economy where retraining doesn’t exist, and another
counterfactual economy where retraining completion rate is higher than it is in the benchmark
economy. This economy can be considered as an economy that has a more effective retraining
system than the benchmark economy. It has the highest retraining rates among the three
economies.
34
Model w/ retraining Model w/ retraining Model w/o retraining
λ = 0.04 λ = 0.08
High-skill 1.1261 1.1256 1.1253
Low-skill 0.8481 0.8025 0.7987
All 1.0042 0.8979 0.8844
Note: This table reports the model predicted mean wages for high- and low-skill workers. λ is the
dropout rate.
Table 9: Model predicted mean wages
Compared to the economy without retraining, the mean wage of low-skill workers is 0.5%
higher in the benchmark economy and 6% higher in the economy with a high completion rate.
This result is consistent with the mechanism explained above. Workers go for higher-paying
jobs when there is a retraining channel, and therefore, get paid better. The mean wage of
high-skill workers shows a similar pattern. The mean wage of high-skill workers is 0.03%
higher in the benchmark economy and 0.08% higher in the economy with a high completion
rate compared to the no-retraining economy. Even though high-skill workers are not directly
affected by retraining rates, their wages are indirectly affected through the number of high-skill
workers in the economy and corresponding income tax revenue. As fewer workers participate in
retraining, fewer high-skill workers are created, and therefore, the income tax revenue decreases.
Consequently, the income tax rate goes up, and after-tax wages decrease for high-skill workers.
Although the mean wage increases for both skills, it increases more among low-skill workers,
making the wage-gap between low- and high-skill workers shrink. The high-skill premium
decreases from 40.9% in the no-retraining economy to 40.3% in the benchmark economy and
to 32.8% in the economy with a high completion rate.
On the other hand, retraining makes the wage distribution within each skill group more
dispersed. Figure 12 plots age-inequality profiles by education level. The wage standard devi-
ation predicted from the model is smaller than that from the data, mainly because the model
lacks employment-to-employment transition resulting in less variability in employment history.
However, the model replicates the U-shape in the data well. The wage standard deviation
is high among young workers. As they accumulate assets and gradually move to high-paying
jobs, their wages converge. This leads to the initial reduction in the wage standard deviation.
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As workers get older, they start to have very different employment histories, which leads to
the rise in the wage standard deviation. Table 10 reports the standard deviation of wages of
the three economies. Compared to the no-retraining economy, the wage standard deviation is
0.08% higher for high-skill workers and 9.1% higher for low-skill workers in the economy with
a high completion rate. The wage standard deviation among high-skill workers is higher in the
benchmark economy because of newly-created high-skill workers. High-skill workers who just
finished retraining tend to own lower levels of assets since they ran down their savings while
retraining. To avoid extended unemployment, they apply for low-paying, easily attainable jobs,
stretching the left end of the wage distribution. Similarly, the wage variance among low-skill
workers is higher in the benchmark economy since retraining participants who drop out are
likely to end up at the lower tail of the wage distribution.
Note: This figure plots the standard deviation of wages by age. The left figure is for low-skill workers,
and the right figure is for high-skill workers.
Figure 12: Age-inequality profiles by skill
In summary, as more workers participate in retraining, between-skill inequality decreases,
and within-skill inequality increases.
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Model w/ retraining Model w/ retraining Model w/o retraining
λ = 0.04 λ = 0.08
High-skill 0.1203 0.1202 0.1202
Low-skill 0.0995 0.0926 0.0912
All 0.1736 0.18 0.1760
Note: This table reports the model predicted mean wages for high- and low-skill workers. λ is the
dropout rate.
Table 10: Model predicted st.d. of wages
1.4.3.2 Retraining and Welfare In this section, I examine the effects of retraining on
workers’ welfare. I assume the agents in the benchmark economy are transferred to a coun-
terfactual economy where retraining is not possible. Then I calculate consumption equivalent,
the remaining lifetime consumption that makes agents indifferent between the two economies.
Everything else is the same between the two economies except the income tax rate. The income
tax rate is higher in the counterfactual economy. The lack of retraining in the counterfactual
economy leads to a smaller tax revenue because fewer high-skill workers are created. To keep
the government budget balanced, the income tax rate should rise by about 4.5 percent.
The results of the welfare analysis is given in table 11. Moving to the economy without
retraining decreases welfare by about 1.5 percent of consumption on average. All workers in
the benchmark economy are worse-off. For high-skill workers, welfare losses come exclusively
from income tax increases. For low-skill workers, on the contrary, the losses come from several
other sources as well as income tax increase. First, eliminating retraining alters workers’ job
application strategies. As I discussed in the previous section, with a lack of retraining, un-
employed workers would rather go for low-paying, easily attainable jobs. This decreases their
re-employment wages but increases their chances of finding a job. The effects on welfare are
ambiguous. Second, in the counterfactual economy, workers tend to save less because they do
not have to save money to retrain in the future, and also they do not have to hold as much
precautionary savings as they face shorter unemployment duration by making safe application
choices. This channel can have positive effects on welfare by increasing consumption. The last
source of welfare changes is their lost opportunities to upgrade skills.
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Age Asset
Low-skill High-skill
Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed
Non-participants Participants
18-22
1st quartile -0.0143 -0.0047 -0.0022 -0.0247 -0.0072
2nd quartile -0.0267 -0.0052 -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0067
3rd quartile -0.0190 -0.0011 -0.0079 -3.1389e-04 -0.0025
4th quartile -0.1476 -0.0011 -0.0370 -1.8505e-04 -0.0048
23-27
1st quartile -0.0053 -0.0018 -0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0028
2nd quartile -0.0291 -0.0014 -0.0025 -5.6435e-04 -0.0130
3rd quartile -0.0027 -3.4600e-04 -0.0143 -6.5554e-04 -0.0022
4th quartile -0.1840 -9.5811e-04 -0.1142 -4.0890e-04 -0.0084
28-32
1st quartile -0.0049 -0.0017 -0.0015 -8.4848e-04 -0.0021
2nd quartile -0.0281 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0063 -0.0113
3rd quartile -4.4161e-04 -7.6116e-05 -0.0072 -7.9607e-04 -0.0025
4th quartile -0.0760 -3.5574e-04 -0.0559 -5.3898e-04 -0.0139
33-37
1st quartile -0.0048 -0.0017 -4.5502e-04 -5.3898e-04 -0.0020
2nd quartile -0.0276 -0.0012 -4.3900e-04 -3.5669e-04 -0.0227
3rd quartile -1.2494e-04 -1.3804e-05 -0.0029 -6.6452e-04 -0.0028
4th quartile -0.0200 -6.5512e-05 -0.0197 -0.0026 -0.0345
38-42
1st quartile -0.0047 -0.0017 -2.3178e-05 -7.9252e-04 -0.0027
2nd quartile -0.0231 -0.0012 -5.5142e-05 -1.6039e-04 -0.0044
3rd quartile -0.0029 -1.9182e-04 -6.4491e-04 -1.6283e-04 -0.0023
4th quartile -0.0101 -1.3065e-04 -0.0045 -0.0049 -0.0518
43-47
1st quartile -0.0024 -7.7524e-04 -0.001 -7.0516e-05 -0.0011
2nd quartile -0.0105 -8.9856e-04 0.000 -5.7326e-05 -0.0017
3rd quartile -0.0052 -5.9124e-04 0.000 -5.0750e-04 -0.0044
4th quartile -0.0522 -8.0435e-04 -2.7976e-05 -0.0079 -0.1353
48-52
1st quartile -1.7700e-04 -4.5964e-05 -2.6039e-04 -5.0107e-06 -2.7928e-05
2nd quartile -3.9793e-04 -3.3950e-05 0.000 -3.6889e-06 -5.9363e-05
3rd quartile -0.0136 -3.7167e-04 0.000 -6.7562e-05 -0.0046
4th quartile -0.0535 -6.1823e-04 0.000 -6.0750e-04 -0.0210
Overall
-0.7694 -0.0302 -0.2780 -0.0593 -0.3689
-1.506
Note: This table presents welfare changes from getting rid of retraining by age, asset, employment status, and
education level.
Results reported as change(%) in the remaining lifetime consumption relative to the benchmark economy.
Table 11: Welfare changes
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To understand the direction and magnitude of each effect, I decompose the welfare changes
from eliminating retraining according to the channels suggested above. To this end, I block each
channel in turn and calculate the welfare changes again. Specifically, I assume that the policy
functions or parameters associated with the channel in interest are fixed at their benchmark
level and re-calculate the value functions in the counterfactual economy. For instance, to
see the effects coming through workers’ optimal search strategies, I assume a worker in the
counterfactual economy chooses the same firm he would have chosen in the benchmark economy.
Column 2 in Table 12 shows welfare changes for low-skill workers with the tax effects excluded.
The average welfare losses increased from -1.078 to -0.761 percent. Column 3 in Table 12
reports the results when the firm choice effects are excluded. Column 4 in Table 12 shows
the case where the saving effects are removed. The average welfare decreases even more when
the search strategy effects and the saving effects are not taken account of, implying that these
two channels offset some of the losses from losing retraining. Overall, the tax, search strategy,
and saving effects together account for about 25 percent of the total welfare losses. The rest
comes from lost opportunities to upgrade skills. The contribution of each channel is different
according to workers’ employment status. Changes in income tax, optimal search strategies,
and optimal savings explain around 35 percent and 42 percent of the welfare losses for the
employed and non-participants, respectively. However, they barely explain the welfare losses of
retraining participants, suggesting most of their losses come from their lost chances to upgrade
skill. It is not surprising since they are the most likely to become high-skill workers.
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Employed -0.769 -0.475 -0.779 -0.786
Non-participants -0.030 -0.009 -0.035 -0.034
Participants -0.278 -0.277 -0.283 -0.281
All -1.078 -0.761 -1.097 -1.101
Note: Scenario 1: All effects considered, i.e., No decomposition.
Scenario 2: Tax effects excluded.
Scenario 3: Firm choice effects excluded.
Scenario 4: Saving effects excluded.
The detailed welfare over asset and age can be found in Table 28-30.
Table 12: Welfare changes for low-skill workers (decomposed)
1.4.4 Policy Implications
I now turn my attention to policy analysis. Government policies in the benchmark economy
resembles unemployment policies of the US; they are more focused on passive labor-market
policies such as insurance benefit rather than active market policies such as retraining. In
this section, I use my model of retraining to simulate alternative policy scenarios where the
government is more actively involved in retraining and explore their macroeconomic effects on
the economy.
I compare five policies, all of which aim to encourage retraining among low-skill unemployed
workers. The policy alternatives I consider are as follows. (1) government pays all the retraining
costs. (2) retraining participants can receive unemployment benefit for a longer period of time
than non-participants. (3) retraining participants can receive higher unemployment benefit
than non-participants.6 (4) there is no unemployment insurance benefit, and retraining costs are
fully covered by government. (5) government pays retraining costs only for selected population
(older and/or low-asset) who are the most reluctant to retrain. These polices are compared to
the benchmark economy where unemployed workers retrain at their own expenses. Under all
policies, the government budget is balanced.
Table 13 presents the main aggregate statistics in the steady states of economies imple-
6Policies (2) and (3) are inspired by the German system, as discussed in (Nie, 2010).
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menting different policies in comparison to the benchmark economy. I find that universal free
retraining results in the highest retraining participation for unemployed workers. However, it
comes with a cost of high taxes; about 27% increase in taxes on labor income is needed to guar-
antee free training for all participants. From the perspective of cost effectiveness, combining
retraining participation with higher insurance benefit yields the best outcome. It achieves an
increase of 1.43 percentage point in retraining. The income tax rate decreases by 9.17 percent.
It is the policy that maximizes the average welfare as well. It increases the average welfare by
3.11 percent.
Although the average welfare of both high- and low-skill workers is the highest under the
policy where retraining participants can receive higher unemployment insurance benefit, the
welfare ordering of policies is not the same between the two skill groups. Since high-skill
workers only care about the tax burden they are going to carry, they prefer policies that yield
smaller tax increase than others, whereas low-skill workers consider the benefits and costs of
retraining as well as income tax. For instance, low-skill workers will choose free retraining with
no insurance benefit over combining retraining participation with longer duration of benefit
receipt even though it comes with higher income tax.
One thing I want to point out here is that all of the policies suggested above would be more
effective if they were implemented along with actions that improve retraining completion rates.
Some of above polices yield considerable tax increases mainly because not many retraining
participants translate into high-skill workers, only increasing the number of new taxpayers by
so much. With a higher completion rate, increased government spending will be partly offset
by increased tax revenue, and therefore the tax increase will not be as large. Since financial
difficulties are one of the most common reasons of discontinuing college education, it is true
that above policies can affect participants’ decisions to drop out. Unfortunately, my model is
not able to capture that since dropping out is considered as an exogenous shock. It will be an
interesting extension to allow retraining participants to decide whether to continue retraining.
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Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 5
Tax 27.22 -6.42 -9.17 1.33 9.50
Retraining Rate 5.44 1.43 1.43 5.41 3.33
Between-skill Inequality -3.75 -1.18 -1.63 -4.27 -3.27
Within-skill Inequality (High) 2.14 0.58 0.58 6.41 7.12
Within-skill Inequality (Low) 6.77 3.34 3.11 8.01 7.54
Welfare (Overall) -5.02 2.41 3.11 -1.87 0.82
Welfare (High) -5.91 1.50 1.66 -2.80 -1.99
Welfare (Low) 0.89 0.90 1.45 0.94 0.82
Note: Policy 1: Government pays all the retraining costs.
Policy 2: Retraining participants can receive unemployment benefit for a longer period of
time than non-participants (up to two years).
Policy 3: Retraining participants can receive higher unemployment benefit than non-
participants
Policy 4: No UI benefit + free retraining
Policy 5: Government pays retraining costs only for selected population (older and/or low-
assets)
Results reported as percent change (percentage point change in case of retraining rate) rel-
ative to the benchmark scenario. The detailed welfare over asset and age can be found in
Table 31-32.
Table 13: Comparison of unemployment policies
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop an overlapping-generations model featuring retraining and directed
job search to study the macroeconomic effects of retraining. Low-skill unemployed workers in
the model either search for jobs or participate in retraining. Retraining is stochastic. Condi-
tional on successfully completing retraining, participants can get better-paying, more highly-
skilled jobs. Non-participants decide which job to apply for by comparing wages against job
finding rates. Wealthy workers apply for high-paying but hard to obtain jobs since they can
survive long unemployment duration.
I use the model to examine the effect retraining has on wage inequality and welfare. Re-
training affects wage inequality by changing unemployed workers’ job search strategies. It
increases the value of unemployment and makes unemployed workers seek higher-paying jobs
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at a given asset level. As a result, re-employment wages increase for low-skill workers, and
the between-skill inequality reduces. Retraining also affects wage inequality indirectly through
workers’ wealth. Newly-created high-skill workers and retraining participants who don’t finish
retraining tend to hold a small amount of assets.Therefore, they go for low-paying but easily
attainable jobs. The constant flow into the lower tail of the wage distribution increases the
within-skill inequality.
Eliminating the retraining channel in the benchmark economy makes everyone worse off.
It yields welfare losses equivalent of 1.5 percent decrease in consumption. The welfare losses
come from income tax increases, changes in optimal firm choices, changes in saving, and lost
opportunities to upgrade skills. The first three channels account for about 25 percent of the
average welfare losses. But they don’t explain much of welfare losses for retraining participants,
implying their losses mainly come from the lost chances to become high-skill workers.
I use the model to evaluate labor-market policies that aim to encourage retraining par-
ticipation. I compare changes in retraining rates, tax increase, and welfare across policies. I
show that combining retraining with more generous unemployment insurance benefit is the best
policy in terms of cost-effectiveness and welfare.
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2.0 Gender Gap in Retraining1
2.1 Introduction
As automation has declined economic opportunities for less-educated workers, getting col-
lege education becomes more important to have a more stable career path. However, working
toward a college degree at the start of someone’s working life does not seem to be enough to
maintain their career. Prolonged working lives and rapid changes at the workplace could re-
quire workers who already have a college degree to constantly upgrade skills throughout their
careers.
The number of workers who pursue further education later in life has increased. However,
there exist gender disparities in the share of workers who do that. Figure 13 shows the share of
people at each age group who participate in any kind of education or training programs, ranging
from on-the-job training to a college education. The share is higher for women regardless of
age. It is especially pronounced among the relatively younger population, those in their late
twenties.
Figure 13: Retraining rate by sex
Over the last three decades, we observe emerging gender gaps that favor women along with
1This chapter is coauthored with Stefania Albanesi
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many dimensions including college enrollment to real wages levels. Figure 13 implies that this
pattern is also shown in lifelong education. It puts a concern that men may not be adjusting to
the rapidly changing labor market as well as women do. As lifelong education becomes more
important, understanding the source of the relative success of a certain demographic group can
help policymakers to design programs to encourage other groups to catch up.
In this paper, we document the evolution of the gender gap in retraining and provide
empirical evidence of what causes it. We propose hypotheses that can possibly explain the
phenomenon and explore each hypothesis one by one. Specifically, we address gender differences
in social skills, occupation distribution, spouses’ employment status and wages, and the impact
of automation.
Several studies (Deming, 2017; Cortes et al., 2018) document that the demand for social
skills has increased in high-end occupations. A wider range of tasks required in such occupations
makes workers’ social skills more valuable because higher social skills make it easier for workers
to specialize in tasks they are good at and trade with co-workers. The high reward for social
skills encourage workers who possess high social skills to invest more in education, which will
give them access to high-end occupations. If women have relatively higher social skills than
men, as many psychological and neuroscientific studies suggest, it could lead to women’s higher
participation in retraining.
We address this hypothesis by examining the relationship between participants’ social skills
and the benefits of retraining. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, we
find that the return to retraining measured by hourly wages increases as participants’ social
skills increase. This boosting effect of social skills on the gain of retraining does not differ by
participants’ gender, implying that women’s higher retraining rates derive from the composition
effects.
The rest of the paper is devoted to examining alternative explanations. We address possibil-
ities that women dominating professions offer greater encouragement and support for continued
learning, that a higher fraction of second-earners and higher spouse wages among women cause
more women to retrain, and that women’s fewer work opportunities in non-college occupations
drive them into seeking more education.
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2.2 Data
Our main data source is the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). The
NLSY97 tracks those who were born between 1980 and 1984 from the year of 1997. The survey
was done on an annual basis until 2010 and switched do a biannual basis after.
Since our interest is in workers who pursue education later in life, we restrict the sample
to those who are over the age of 23. We exclude respondents who have less than a high school
education. Respondents who have military experience are also discarded.
The NLSY97 provides monthly schooling and training information not only for those who
are school age but also for the older population. Figure 14 breaks retraining down into specific
programs. It shows that more than half of the workers who seek further education or training
do so through a college education. The share of short-term vocational training and on-the-job
training, which are considered as traditional retraining programs, is much smaller than that of
a college education.
Figure 14: Composition of retraining
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Women’s higher retraining participation is driven by a college education. Figure 15 and
Figure 16 plot retraining rates of the four most popular retraining programs. Women’s higher
participation rates in two-year and four-year college education are not observed in short-term
vocational training and on-the-job training. Gender differences in participation rates are neg-
ligible in such programs. Since the purpose of this study is to explain gender disparities in
retraining participation, we restrict our attention to a college education.
Figure 15: Retraining rate, college education
Table 14 provides summary statistics on the characteristics of retraining participants. Al-
most 60 percent of participants do not hold a college degree at the time they start retraining.
Comparing between men and women, women participants are on average more educated than
men. The fraction of participants who hold a Bachelor’s degree is significantly higher for women
than men. This rules out the possibility that more women put off going to college than men.
Many participants earn while they learn. About 37 percent of them are employed full-time,
23 percent work part-time, and the rest 37 percent are either unemployed or not in the labor
force. Women participants are more likely to work part-time than men.
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Figure 16: Retraining rate, vocational and on-the-job training
All Males Females
Age 27.54 27.39 27.63 *
White (%) 45.16 46.24 44.46
Married (%) 27.91 24.31 30.18 ***
Equivalent to HS degree (%) 58.13 63.71 54.13 ***
AA degree (%) 19.52 17.73 20.80
BA degree (%) 20.46 16.91 23.01 **
More than BA degree (%) 1.89 1.65 2.06
Full-time working (%) 36.68 39.90 34.62 **
Part-time working (%) 23.16 19.01 25.82 ***
Not employed (%) 36.95 37.84 36.37
Observation 1829 718 1111
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%
Table 14: Summary statistics, participant characteristics
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Table 15 presents the duration, costs, and completion rate of retraining. Participants spend
on average about 28 months on retraining. The out-of-pocket expenses per term are about $459.
A participant is considered to have completed retraining if the reason she leaves program is
because she completed and received a degree and she stayed long enough time at the program.
The completion rate is surprisingly low. Only about 24 percent of participants manage to
complete the program. Women have a slightly higher completion rate than men, but the
difference is not significant.
All Males Females
Duration (month) 28.60 28.41 28.72
Out-of-pocket expense ($) 458.85 443.71 469.08
Completion rate (%) 23.89 22.56 24.75
Table 15: Summary statistics, retraining
2.3 Hypotheses
This section discusses possible explanations for the gender gap in retraining participation.
We first test whether social skill differences between men and women can explain women’s
higher retraining rates. We estimate the return to retraining and see if the return increases
with participants’ social skills. The results suggest that it is an important mechanism. Next,
we consider whether women tend to work in professions where employers are more involved in
employee’s training. We show suggestive evidence that generous support for workers’ continued
education in healthcare occupations can explain some of the gender disparities in retraining.
Finally, we discuss whether women’s second-earner status within households or the dispropor-
tionate impact of automation on women plays a role. Neither appears to contribute to gender
disparities in retraining participation.
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2.3.1 Social Skills
Many studies have addressed the growing importance of social skills in high-paying, college-
level occupations. Deming (2017) estimates the return to social skills using the NLSY. He
finds that a one standard deviation increase in social skills increases real hourly wages by 10.7
percent. He also shows that workers with a higher level of social skills sort into non-routine and
social skill-intensive occupations, which are likely to be high-paying occupations. He explains
the popularity of social skills in high-paying occupations as a gain from “task trade”. College-
level occupations mostly consist of non-routine tasks that require workers to perform a wider
set of tasks than lower-skill occupations that are routine task intensive. Workers in college-
level occupations can enjoy gains from specialization by focusing on tasks that they have the
comparative advantage of and trading with other workers. Higher social skills are valuable in
these occupations because they lower the cost of trading. As a result, workers who possess
higher social skills have higher productivity, and therefore, higher returns.
Cortes et al. (2018) suggest that the increasing demand for social skills explains women’s
outpacing performance in the labor market over the past several decades. Under the assump-
tion that women have a comparative advantage at social skill-intensive tasks, they show that
high-wage occupations have experienced both an increase in social skill-intensive tasks and an
increase in the female share of employment relative to other occupations.
Women’s higher social skills could explain the gender disparity in retraining participation
as well. Higher returns to social skills in college-level occupations encourage workers with high
social skills to receive a college education. If women have on average higher social skills than
men, this difference in social skill distribution could lead to higher retraining participation for
women.
To examine this hypothesis, in this section, we first compare the distributions of cognitive,
non-cognitive, and social skills between men and women in the NLSY97. We then estimate the
return to retraining and show that the return increases with participants’ social skills.
We create participants’ social skill measures following Deming (2017). The NLSY97 provides
the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI). The TIPI test consists of ten pairs of personality
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traits. The respondents are required to rate how well each pair of traits applies to them, on a
scale of 1 to 7. The social skill measure is based on two pairs -Extraverted, enthusiastic and
Reserved, quiet- of them. We standardize each variable, take the average across them, and
re-standardize the average.
Figure 17 compares the distribution of social skills between men and women in the sample.
The figure indicates that women’s social skill distribution is more skewed to the left than men’s.
60.6 percent of women have social skills higher than the median. The number is 54.1 percent for
men. The gender difference in social skills is more pronounced in the lowest social skill group.
26.2 percent of men belong to the lowest social skill group, whereas 20 percent of women have
such low social skills. If participants with higher social skills enjoy a higher return to retraining,
this difference in social skill distribution will generate the difference in retraining participation.
Figure 17: Social skill distribution, by sex
Figure 18 compares the distribution of other skills between men and women. Partici-
pants’ cognitive skill is proxied by the standardized scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(AFQT). Following Deming (2017), we combine seven traits - organized, conscientiousness, de-
pendability, thoroughness, trustingness, disciplined, and carefulness - to measure participants’
non-cognitive skills. Figure 18 indicates that an average woman in the sample is more likely to
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have higher cognitive and non-cognitive skills than an average man. The differences in cognitive
and non-cognitive skills, however, are not as sharp as the differences in social skills.
Figure 18: Cognitive and non-cognitive skill distribution, by sex
To observe the relationship between social skills and the return to retraining, we regress log
hourly wages on retraining participation and a variety of other covariates:
ln(wageij) = β0 + β1 ∗RTij + β2 ∗RTij ∗ Tij
+ β3 ∗RTij ∗ SSi + β4 ∗RTij ∗ Tij ∗ SSi + γ ∗Xij + ηi + δj + ij (2.1)
RTij identifies participant i’s retraining participation. RTij is one if participant i starts retrain-
ing before age j. Tij denotes time since the start of retraining. It is defined as age j minus
the age participant i starts retraining. The return to retraining T years after participants start
retraining is given as β1 + β2 ∗ T . SSi is participant i’s social skills. We include a set of inter-
action terms, RTij ∗ SSi and RTij ∗ Tij ∗ SSi, to observe how the return to retraining changes
as participants’ social skills increase.
The results are in Table 16. All specifications include controls for race, gender, skill measures
(cognitive, non-cognitive, and social), education level at age 23, occupation, and age and year
(indexed by t) fixed effects. The return to retraining is negative up until four years after
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participants start retraining. This reflects income losses during retraining and the cost of
switching careers. Column 1 shows that hourly wages increase by 2.3% every year, and a
participant who has one standard deviation higher social skills enjoys a 1.6 % bigger wage
increase each year. In column 4, the number becomes slightly lower with other skill measures
included but remains statistically significant. Column 2 and column 3 show how the return to
retraining changes with cognitive and non-cognitive skills, respectively. We find that neither
an increase of cognitive nor non-cognitive skills yields an additional wage gain.
Outcome is Log Hourly Wage (1) (2) (3) (4)
Retraining -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.110*** -0.101***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Retraining * Time 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Retraining * Social -0.038 -0.042
(0.031) (0.033)
Retraining * Time * Social 0.016** 0.015**
(0.006) (0.007)
Retraining * Cognitive -0.045 -0.028
(0.037) (0.038)
Retraining * Time * Cognitive 0.003 0.001
(0.008) (0.008)
Retraining * Noncognitive 0.018 0.016
(0.031) (0.033)
Retraining * Time * Noncognitive 0.008 0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
Additional Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 23,802 23,813 23,802 23,802
Number of individuals 3,345 3,346 3,345 3,345
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%
Table 16: Return to retraining
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Table 16 implies that women’s higher retraining participation can be considered as compo-
sition effects. Women’s retraining rates are higher because there are more women in the upper
bracket of the social skill distribution. To see whether this is the case, we modify the regression
equation above by including an additional set of interaction terms with the female indicator.
The regression equation is given as:
ln(wageij) = β0 + β1 ∗RTij + β2 ∗RTij ∗ Tij
+ β3 ∗RTij ∗ SSi + β4 ∗RTij ∗ Tij ∗ SSi + β5 ∗RTij ∗ Femalei + β6 ∗RTij ∗ Tij ∗ Femalei
+ β7 ∗RTij ∗ SSi ∗ Femalei + β8 ∗RTij ∗ Tij ∗ SSi ∗ Femalei + γ ∗Xij + ηi + δj + ij (2.2)
β5 and β6 show if the return to retraining for women is different from men’s. β7 and β8 show
whether the effects of social skills on the return are different between men and women.
The results are shown in Table 17. The coefficients of female interaction terms are statis-
tically insignificant. It indicates that the return to retraining does not favor a specific gender
and that higher returns for participants with higher social skills exist among both men and
women. Including cognitive and non-cognitive skills do not change these results.
The only difference between men and women is in the effects of participants’ cognitive
skills. For women, the return to retraining decreases as participants’ cognitive skills increase.
We do not observe this among male participants. A male participant who has one standard
deviation higher cognitive skills earns 1.9 percent additional wage gain from retraining each
year. However, his female counterpart experiences a drop of 1.9 percent instead.
2.3.2 Occupations
Retraining could be more common in a certain group of occupations. Some occupations en-
courage workers to receive further education by rewarding them with better pay and promotion
or sharing some of the education costs.
Nursing, a common female occupation, is one of those occupations that further education is
highly encouraged. Although a four-year college degree is not necessary to enter the profession,
there has been an increasing effort to raise the proportion of nurses educated at the bachelor’s
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Outcome is Log Hourly Wage (1) (2) (3) (4)
Retraining -0.095* -0.093* -0.093* -0.085*
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
Retraining * Time 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.027*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Female * Retraining -0.006 -0.012 -0.033 -0.022
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070)
Female * Retraining * Time -0.018 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Retraining * Social -0.014 -0.012
(0.049) (0.053)
Retraining * Time * Social 0.022** 0.019*
(0.010) (0.011)
Female * Retraining * Social -0.034 -0.038
(0.064) (0.067)
Female *Retraining * Time * Social -0.010 -0.010
(0.013) (0.014)
Retraining * Cognitive -0.075 -0.048
(0.052) (0.056)
Retraining * Time * Cognitive 0.019* 0.014
(0.011) (0.012)
Female * Retraining * Cognitive 0.076 0.064
(0.074) (0.077)
Female * Retraining * Time * Cognitive -0.038** -0.036**
(0.017) (0.017)
Retraining * Noncognitive 0.011 0.001
(0.043) (0.049)
Retraining * Time * Noncognitive 0.008 0.002
(0.010) (0.011)
Female * Retraining * Noncognitive 0.040 0.034
(0.064) (0.069)
Female * Retraining * Time * Noncognitive -0.001 0.003
(0.013) (0.014)
Additional Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 23,802 23,813 23,802 23,802
Number of individuals 3,345 3,346 3,345 3,345
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%
Table 17: Return to retraining, by sex
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level. In 2010, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) recommended healthcare organizations increase
the share of BSN-prepared nurses to 80 percent by the year 2020. In 2017, New York State
passed the BSN in 10 law, under which registered nurses (RNs) are required to obtain a Bachelor
of Science in Nursing (BSN) within a decade of receiving their RN license.
In response to a high demand for quality nurses, many local hospitals offer financial as-
sistance such as tuition reimbursement to have their nurses work toward a BSN. There are
government programs in place as well. Nurse Corps Loan Repayment Program pays up to 85%
of unpaid nursing education debt for licensed registered nurse, advanced practice registered
nurse, and nurse faculty member in exchange for working at a Critical Shortage Facility or an
eligible school of nursing for at least two years.
Education, another female dominant profession, also has bespoke government-sponsored
financial aid programs. TEACH Grant, Teacher Loan Forgiveness Program, and Teacher Loan
Cancellation Program provide current or future teachers financial assistance in exchange for
teaching in a low-income school for a certain period of time. Since Health and Education occu-
pations are traditionally female-dominated, relatively generous support from such occupations
could encourage women seeking a second-career to consider pursuing a college education.
Figure 19 shows the current or the most recent occupations participants hold before they
start retraining. A large fraction of both men and women participants work or worked in
office and administrative support occupations and sales occupations, which are typical routine
occupations where employment has been declining. The share of food preparation and serving
occupations is also high in both groups.
Occupations that show the most profound gender differences are healthcare and education
related occupations. Healthcare related occupations are the second most popular occupations
among women participants. About 16 percent of women participants have worked healthcare
practitioner and technical occupations or healthcare support occupations. Education, Training,
and Library occupations also make up a big portion of women. About 7.4 percent of women
participants have held such occupations. In contrast, only about 5.6 percent of men participants
have worked in healthcare and education related occupations combined. Among men, the
fraction of routine manual occupations is high (28 percent).
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Figure 19: Original occupations of retraining participants
Figure 20 presents majors participants choose in college. For men, most popular majors
include business, management, and marketing related, computer and information sciences, and
health related programs. For women, health related programs are the most popular by a large
margin. Business related programs are popular among women as well as men. Education is
quite popular among women, but only a few men choose it. Computer sciences is the opposite.
It is one of the most popular subjects among men, but only a little over 1 percent of women
choose it as a major.
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Figure 20: Majors of participants
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We observe a correlation between occupation and the major they choose in college among
female participants. 67 percent of those who have had health related occupations major health
professions and related programs. 25 percent of those who worked in the education profes-
sion opt into education related programs. However, we do not see such a correlation among
men. It indicates that generous employer support for workers’ continued education in profes-
sions in which about a quarter of working-age women work is contributing to women’s higher
participation in retraining.
2.3.3 Marital Status
Workers who have working spouses are in a better position to pursue a different career
because they do not have to worry as much about making a living as singles do. Table 14 shows
that the share of married among participants is significantly higher for women than men. Within
those who are married, spouses’ annual income is almost twice as high for women participants.
Table 18 compares spouse wages between participants and non-participants. Participants who
are married have about 33 percent higher spouse wages than non-participants. All of the above
raises the possibility that women’s higher retraining rates could be because of the higher fraction
of secondary earners among them.
Participants Non-participants
All 16830.67 12613.96 ***
Males 13597.2 9334.14 ***
Females 19293.08 16381.93 **
Note: **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%
Table 18: Comparison of spouse wages
Although spouse wages appear to be an important predictor in one’s retraining decision,
it does not fully explain the gender gap in retraining. Figure 21 plots retraining rates by
marital status. The gender gap in retraining exists among both singles and married workers.
Differences in spouse wages may explain some of the gender disparities among the married.
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However, they do not explain the gender gap that exists among singles, who make up a larger
portion of participants.
Figure 21: Retraining rate, by marital status
2.3.4 Non-college Job Opportunities
Workers would not bother to go to college if they have plenty of career options they can
consider without a college education. This could matter more to workers who consider going
back to school in the middle of a career if many of them consider a career change because
the prospects in their current career are not promising. Kim (2020) shows that decreasing job
opportunities in high-school level occupations is the most important factor that has contributed
to the rise in retraining. The contribution is even bigger than increasing college wage premium.
If employment opportunities for low-skill workers are more abundant for men, that could
contribute to their relative reluctance to retrain. Chuan (2017) makes a similar argument. She
shows that women’s decreasing non-college employment opportunities due to the automation of
office and administrative support occupations have increased women’s college enrollment. She
observes a widening gender gap in college enrollment in the local labor market with a higher
fraction of routine-intensive occupations.
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In this section, we address the possibility that low-skill women have been hit harder by
automation than low-skill men. They choose to retrain themselves to compensate for their
declined job opportunities. We use job transition rates as the measures of workers’ job oppor-
tunities. Job finding rates show how easy it is for workers to find a job, and job separation rates
show how stable workers’ current jobs are. If there are more work opportunities for low-skill
men than women, they will observe higher job finding rates and lower job separation rates.
Table 19 and Table 20 present evidence against Chuan (2017). Monthly job finding rates for
low-skill men in the NLSY97 are about 13.1 percent. It is only slightly higher than women’s job
finding rates of 12.4 percent. We do not observe significant gender differences in job separation
rates either. Overall, we do not find evidence that men have more abundant non-college job
opportunities than women.
Males Females
NRCG 1.1% 2.4%
RCG 2.9% 5.6%
RMN 6.4% 1.4%
NRMN 2.7% 3.0%
All 13.1% 12.4%
Table 19: Job finding rates, workers with no college education
Males Females
NRCG 0.1% 0.2%
RCG 0.3% 0.5%
RMN 0.6% 0.1%
NRMN 0.2% 0.3%
All 1.2% 1.2%
Table 20: Job separation rates, workers with no college education
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2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we address possible explanations of gender disparities in retraining participa-
tion in the U.S. We discuss the role of social skills, occupations, marital status, and non-college
job opportunities.
Our main focus is the contribution of social skills. Workers’ social skills are valued more
in high-paying, college-level occupations where collaborative work among co-workers is more
important. The higher demand for social skills in college-level occupations motivates workers
with high social skills to go to college. If there are gender differences in social skills, it will
result in differences in retraining participation. Using the NLSY97, we show that women have on
average higher social skills than men and that the return to retraining is bigger for participants
who possess higher social skills. This evidence supports the hypothesis that gender disparities
in retraining participation come from the differences in social skills.
We also show evidence that female occupations are more supportive in terms of workers’
education than male occupations. For example, healthcare occupations encourage their workers
to work toward higher degrees by providing various tuition reimbursement programs, contribut-
ing women’s higher retraining rates. Spouse’s wages affect retraining participation. Although
women are more likely to be second earners within households, it does not explain the gender
gap that exists among singles. We do not find evidence that low-skill women are hit harder by
automation than low-skill men.
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3.0 The Static and Dynamic Effects of Collaboration1
3.1 Introduction
Collaboration among researchers in economics has been substantially increasing. As shown
in Figure 22, the share of solo-authored papers in the field of Economics and Business has been
persistently decreasing. The share of double-authored papers started to decrease from the early
2000s. In contrast, the share of papers written by more than two authors has been continuously
increasing. In the year of 2018, three-authored papers comprise the largest share among the
papers published in the top 100 Economics and Business journals.
Figure 22: Co-authorship trend over time
Does academic collaboration always yield a better outcome than solo work? How does it
affect participants’ research productivity? It is important to answer these questions as collab-
1This chapter is coauthored with Douglas Hanley and Sewon Hur.
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oration becomes more and more common in academia. There have been many studies that try
to examine the effect academic collaboration has on research productivity, but there is no full
agreement. Laband and Tollison (2000), Wuchty et al. (2007), Chung et al. (2009), Azoulay
et al. (2010), and Ductor (2015) show collaboration enhances research productivity while Med-
off (2003) and Bozeman and Corley (2004) suggest there is no effect. Hollis (2001) even finds
negative effects. In this paper, we suggest a new approach to understand the static and dynamic
effects of academic collaboration on research productivity.
What distinguishes our study from the existing literature is that we specify a functional
relationship between collaboration and productivity. In our framework, a researcher’s human
capital is a function of his publication history and innate ability. When a group of researchers
decides to collaborate, their human capital is combined by the CES production technology
and produces a research outcome. The elasticity of substitution in the CES production func-
tion measures the degree of complementarities between any two researchers. We estimate the
researchers’ human capital function and research outcome production function using the infor-
mation on published papers from 1970 to 2018 in the field of Economics and Business.
Our point estimate of the elasticity of substitution between researchers is around 0.96,
suggesting that researchers are imperfect complements. Using the estimated functions and
the data on published papers, we document a set of stylized facts about collaboration. We
find that academia consists of a large number of researchers with low human capital and only
a few researchers with high human capital. Collaboration mostly takes place among equally
productive researchers. Researchers’ human capital is closely related to the quantity and quality
of co-authorship; researchers with higher human capital have more collaboration opportunities
and tend to collaborate with more highly productive researchers.
To understand the effects of collaboration on researchers’ productivity, we simulate the
human capital growth of the median researcher under different collaboration scenarios. Com-
paring a scenario of solo work to a scenario of collaboration, we find that collaborating with an
equally productive coauthor generates around 40% of gain in human capital. This ‘teamwork
premium’ persists over time. We show that the link between researchers’ human capital and
the quantity and quality of collaboration opportunities plays an important role in explaining
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the persistent effects of collaboration. The rise in human capital from the initial collaboration
brings the researcher more collaboration opportunities with more highly productive researchers,
which translate into even bigger human capital growth. In the counterfactual analysis where
we ignore the link, we show that the effects of collaboration on the researcher’s human capital
diminish quickly over time.
The effects of collaboration vary by researchers’ human capital, coauthors’ human capital,
and the number of coauthors. We assign the given researcher a set of different coauthors and see
the resulting effects on human capital. We find that conditional on having an equally productive
coauthor, the immediate gain from collaboration is bigger for low-productivity researchers.
However, in the long run, the benefit of collaboration is bigger for highly productive researchers.
We also show that the teamwork premium increases with the coauthors’ human capital and
decreases with the number of coauthors.
This study is related to the literature on the relationship between academic collaboration
and research productivity. The contribution of this paper to this literature is threefold. First,
we specify a functional relationship between collaboration and research productivity, whereas
other papers simply assume linearity. We measure the degree of complementarities between
researchers by estimating the elasticity of substitution between researchers. Second, we examine
the dynamic effects of collaboration. We show that the effects of collaboration are persistent
over time due to the interaction between human capital and future collaboration opportunities.
Third, we study the effects of collaboration between asymmetric researchers. Our framework
allows us to experiment with various types of collaboration by assigning a given researcher a
set of coauthors with different characteristics.
This study is also related to the literature estimating the elasticity of substitution between
workers. A large set of papers estimate the elasticity of substitution between skilled and un-
skilled workers (Fallon and Layard, 1975; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Angrist, 1995; Card and
Lemieux, 2001; Ciccone and Peri, 2005), between natives and immigrants (Card, 2001; Borjas,
2003; Peri and Sparber, 2009; Borjas et al., 2008; Barone and Mocetti, 2011; Ottaviano and
Peri, 2012), or between males and females (Acemoglu et al., 2004; De Giorgi et al., 2013). Un-
like other papers focus on complementarities between different types of workers, we examine
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it between more homogeneous workers -highly educated academics- whose work inherently re-
quires a high level of collaboration. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to estimate the
elasticity of substitution between academics.
An outline of the paper follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 describes the estimation methodology and presents the results. Section 5 explores the
relationship between collaboration and research productivity. Section 6 provides the conclusion.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Researchers’ Human Capital
Researchers’ human capital evolves over time following the law of motion below:
Hrt = Xrt + (1− δ)Hr,t−1 + νr (3.1)
Hrt denotes researcher r’s human capital in time t. It consists of newly-accumulated human
capital Xrt, human capital from the previous period, Hr,t−1, and the researcher’s innate research
ability, νr. δ denotes the human capital depreciation rate.
Xrt is measured as the quality adjusted publications in time t. It consists of the quantity
and quality of publications, taking the form of Cobb-Douglas production function. Xrt is given
as:
Xrt = P
α1
rt Q
α2
rt (3.2)
where Prt is the number of papers researcher r publishes in time t and Qrt is the average
quality of those papers. α1 and α2 are the output elasticities of the quality and quantity of the
publications, respectively. Qrt is given as:
Qrt =
∑
p∈Prt θrpqpt
Prt
(3.3)
where qpt denotes the quality of individual publication p in time t, and θrp denotes researcher
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r’s contribution to p. We assume θrp =
1√
Ap
2.
Put together, researcher r’s human capital in time t is a function of his publication history
and innate ability. Hrt is given as:
Hrt = f(Prt, Qrt, Pr,t−1, Qr,t−1, · · · , Pr,t∗(r), Qr,t∗(r);α1, α2, δ) + νr (3.4)
where r, t∗(r) is the time that researcher r first appears in academia.
3.2.2 Research Output Production
A group of researchers works on the same research project as a team. Each member’s human
capital accumulated up until period tp, the time publication p is created, is combined by the
CES production technology. Each team produces one publication. The production function is
therefore given by:
qp = A
β
p
[∑
r∈R
1
Ap
(
Hrtp−1
)ρ] 1ρ
+ p, ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), p ∼ N(0, σ2 ) (3.5)
where qp is the quality of publication p, and Hrtp−1 is the human capital of researcher r in tim
tp − 1. Ap is the number of authors of publication p. β measures the effects of the size of
the team on the quality of the publication. ρ is the substitution parameter. The elasticity of
substitution between any two researchers is defined as:
σ =
1
1− ρ (3.6)
It measures the degree of complementarities between any two researchers. Researchers are gross
substitutes if σ > 1 , and gross complements if σ < 1. p is the error term. We assume it follows
the standard normal distribution.
2This is a common way for schools to calculate the contribution of a researcher to a co-authored paper when
they decide on the researcher’s salary (Hamermesh, 2013).
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3.3 Data and Variables
In this section, we discuss the data and the construction of the variables. The main data set
we use is obtained from Web of Science. It contains detailed information on papers published
between 1970 and 2018 in the top 100 Economics and Business journals. The journal ranking
is obtained from Scimago journal and country rank3. The data set provides papers’ titles,
author’ names, authors’ affiliations, year of publication, name of journals, length, and number
of citations.
3.3.1 Paper Quality
We use both citation and journal information to measure the quality of the paper. The
quality of paper qp is given as:
qp =
TCp × SJRptp
PGp
(3.7)
TCp is the annual average of total citations. It is defined as the total number of citations the
paper has received as of the year 2018 devided by the age of the paper. SJRptp is a widely
used measure for journal prestige. It is calculated as the average number of weighted citations
in the selected year divided by the number of documents published in the journal in the three
previous years. PGp is the length of the manuscript. Since longer papers receive more citations,
we include the number of pages of the manuscript in the denominator.
3.3.2 Ability
Since researchers’ innate ability νr is not observable, we use the information on researchers’
first affiliations to approximate it. Researchers’ research ability is evaluated officially for the
first time in the job market. Given that a researcher’s job market result is the combination
of the quality of his job market paper, the school that he receives his degree from, and the
advisors’ subjective opinion on his ability, using the information on his first affiliation as a
3A list of the journals can be found in Table 1
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proxy for his research ability seems reasonable. We measure the quality of an institution in a
given year as the three-year average of the quality of the papers that its researchers produce.
3.3.3 Affiliations
Since we use the first affiliation of a researcher as the proxy for his ability, it is crucial to
identify each researcher’s primary affiliation. However, unfortunately, we do not always observe
the primary affiliation of each author. For some cases, we only have a list of authors’ names
and a list of the affiliations, but not the exact matching between them. To solve this problem,
we calculate piirt, the probability that researcher r works for institution i in period t. For each
publication p ∈ Prt of researcher r in period t, we define piiprt = 1 if the institution is uniquely
identified and piiprt =
1
Iprt
if the institution is not uniquely identified where Iprt is the number
of institutions listed in publication p. piiprt = 1 in the case of single authors, single listed
institutions, reprint authors, and papers published after 2007. piirt is given as:
piirt =
∑t+3
τ=t−3
∑
p∈Prτ piiprτw(τ, t)∑t+3
τ=t−3
∑
p∈Prτ w(τ, t)
(3.8)
where w(τ, t) are weights centered around τ = t. piirt is well-defined if r has at least one
publication in a 7-year window.
Another problem with the data set is that, for the papers published prior to 2008, we do
not observe the authors’ full names. Only the last names and the initials of the first names
are listed. It is problematic since we can’t tell apart the researchers who share the same last
name and the initial of the first name. It is more pronounced among Asian authors since there
is less variation in Asian last names. To avoid potential bias it can cause, we start our analysis
with the papers published after 2007. This way, we can identify each researcher’s full name and
primary affiliation for sure. A downside of restricting the sample to the papers published after
2007 is that we do not observe first affiliations for those who enter academia prior to 2008. We
use their affiliation information in 2008 instead. We further restrict the sample to the papers
with five or fewer authors. Less than 1% of the papers have more than 5 authors. The final
data set consists of 52, 027 papers and 62, 165 researchers. Table 21 presents summary statistics
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of the data. An average researcher in the data produces one paper per year. He collaborates
with other researchers for most of the papers. He has 2 coauthors per year. An average paper
in the data is 6 years old, receives 23 citations, has a SJR measure of 4, and is written by 2.4
authors.
Mean SD Min Max
A. authors (n. 62,165)
Number of papers 1.16 0.33 1 6.45
Average paper quality 0.53 0.81 0 58.13
Share of co-authored papers (%) 94.47 17.85 0 100
Number of coauthors 2.07 1.02 0 14
Number of coauthors per paper 1.78 0.78 0 4
B. papers (n. 51,512)
Age 5.62 3.11 1 11
Number of citations 23.15 46.82 1 2461
Journal quality (SJR) 3.99 3.8 0.21 22.9
Pages 20.28 10.51 1 118
Number of authors 2.43 0.91 1 5
For panel A, all variables are the yearly average.
The average paper quality is calculated following equation (7).
The age of papers is calculated as 2018-the year published+1.
SJR is obtained from Scimago Journal & Country Rank, the rest
from Web of Science.
Table 21: Summary statistics
3.4 Estimation
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we discuss the estimation strategy of the model. The right hand side of
our regression equation consists of two non-linear equations, one of them is nested inside of
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the other. Neither equation takes a particularly complex form. Once nested, however, the
estimation process can get challenging. To avoid unnecessary complexity, we develop a method
that allows us to estimate each equation separately.
The estimation of the model is a two-stage process. In the first stage, we estimate α1, α2, and
δ. In this stage, we restrict the sample to the solo-authored papers. The estimation equation
(5) then reduces to the following equation:
qp = Hrtp−1 + p
= Xrtp−1 + (1− δ)Xrtp−2 + (1− δ)2Xrtp−3 + · · · (1− δ)tXr0 + νr + p
= Pα1rtp−1Q
α2
rtp−1 + (1− δ)Pα1rtp−2Qα2rtp−2 + · · ·+ (1− δ)tPα1r0 Qα2r0 + νr + p (3.9)
We apply nonlinear least square estimation to estimate equation (9).
With equation (1) and estimated parameters α1, α2, and δ, we calculate each researcher’s
human capital, Hrt. In the second stage, we estimate β and σ. To make the estimation
process simpler, we obtain a linear approximation of the CES production function around
ρ = 0 following Kmenta (1967). We first take logarithm over equation. The log-transformation
of the equation is given as:
ln qp = β lnAp +
1
ρ
ln
[∑
r
1
Ap
(Hrtp−1)
ρ
]
(3.10)
The second degree Taylor Polynomial for ln
[∑
r
1
Ap
(Hrtp−1)
ρ
]
is given as:
ln
∑
r
1
Ap
(Hrtp−1)
ρ ≈ ρ 1
Ap
∑
r
lnHrtp−1 +
ρ2
2
1
(Ap)2
[∑
r
(lnHrtp−1)
2 − (
∑
r
lnHrtp−1)
2
]
(3.11)
We replace ln
[∑
r
1
Ap
(Hrtp−1)
ρ
]
in equation (10) with its quadratic approximation shown
in equation (11). Then the final regression equation is as follows:
ln qp − 1
Ap
∑
r
lnHrtp−1 = b1 lnAp + b2
∑
i
∑
j
lnHitp−1 lnHjtp−1 (3.12)
where b1 = β and b2 =
ρ
2
.
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3.4.2 Result: Human Capital Function
Table 22 reports the estimation results from the first stage. The estimates are all statistically
significant. The results suggest that human capital responds more sensitively to the quality
than the quantity of the paper. A 1% increase of the average paper quality is associated with
0.462% increase in human capital while a 1% increase of the paper quantity yields 0.129%
increase in human capital. The depreciation rate is estimated to be around 0.641.
Coef. Std. Err.
α1 0.129 0.074 *
α2 0.462 0.030 ***
δ 0.641 0.037 ***
Obs 6,660
Time fixed effects are included.
*significant at 10%
**significant at 5%
***significant at 1%
Table 22: Human capital function, mixed-effects ML nonlinear regression
With the estimated values of α1, α2, and δ, we calculate each researcher’s human capital
over time following equation (1) and (2). Figure 23 presents the distributions of researchers’
human capital. The distribution of human capital is skewed to the right, with a large number of
researchers with human capital close to zero. The distribution of log human capital is close to
the normal distribution. Figure 24 displays the cumulative distribution of researchers’ human
capital. It also shows that academia consists of a few researchers with high human capital and
a large number of researchers with low human capital. This finding is similar to what Conley
and Onder (2014) find in their analysis on the productivity of new economics Ph.D.s. They
find that the majority of the economics PhD graduates fail to produce a creditable number of
publications by their sixth year after graduation4. Our results show that we can observe the
same pattern in human capital of a larger set of economists.
4The number of AER-equivalent papers of the median at year six is below 0.1 in all cases and is in fact zero
in most(Conley and Onder, 2014).
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Figure 23: Distribution of human capital of researchers
Figure 24: Cumulative distribution of human capital of researchers
We use researchers’ human capital to understand how co-authorship is formed. We compare
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human capital of coauthors of each paper. Figure 25 displays the distribution of papers ac-
cording to the average absolute deviation of human capital among coauthors. The distribution
is rightly skewed, showing that human capital differences among authors are small for most
papers. It is more pronounced for the papers with fewer authors. We find that the average
absolute deviation of human capital among authors is within one standard deviation in 92% of
the cases. These results imply that collaboration mostly takes place among similarly productive
researchers.
Figure 25: Distribution of papers over the average absolute deviation of human capital
Now we turn our interest to the relationship between researchers’ human capital and their
collaboration opportunities. How many collaboration opportunities a researcher can have
largely depends on his human capital. Researchers choose whom to work with. It is not
hard to imagine that highly productive researchers will receive more offers than low-productive
researchers. Human capital does not just affect the amount of co-authorship. It also affects
the quality of the potential coauthors a researcher can have. Highly productive researchers
will be willing and able to work with other highly productive researchers than low productive
researchers will be.
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To examine the effects of a researcher’s human capital on the quantity and quality of his
coauthors, we regress a set of variables on human capital of the researchers. The set of dependent
variables includes (1) the number of solo papers, (2) the number of co-authored papers, (3) the
number of coauthors, (4) the number of coauthors per paper, and (5) the average coauthor
human capital. Each regression also includes year fixed effects to control for time-varying
factors that can affect the dependent variables.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 23. Column 1 through 4 in Table 23 present
the effects of human capital on the quantity aspect of co-authorship. An increase in human
capital increases the number of solo papers, co-authored papers, coauthors, and coauthors per
paper. The effects are statistically significant but very small. Column 5 shows the effects
of human capital on the quality aspect of co-authorship. The result says that for every 1%
increase of human capital, the average coauthor human capital increases by 0.305%. The
effects are statistically significant.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Hrt) 0.011*** 0.091*** 0.146*** 0.151*** 0.305***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 42,982 42,982 42,982 40,300 40,034
R-sq 0.0072 0.0139 0.0053 0.0068 0.1329
(1) Dependent variable: the number of solo papers
(2) Dependent variable: the number of co-authored papers
(3) Dependent variable: the number of coauthors
(4) Dependent variable: the average number of coauthors per paper
(5) Dependent variable: log(the average human capital of coauthors)
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
Table 23: Human capital and the quantity and quality of co-authorship, OLS regression
Table 24 compares solo-papers and co-authored papers. Co-authored papers are older,
shorter, published in more prestigious journals, and have more citations. Overall, co-authored
papers have a higher quality measure, q. We do not find significant differences in the average
human capital and the average absolute deviance in human capital among authors between
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solo-papers and co-authored papers.
Number of authors = 1 Number of authors > 1
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Age 4.844 3.250 5.736 3.067 ***
Average Hr 0.986 0.747 0.977 0.598
Average absolute deviance in Hr 0 0 0.257 0.284
q 0.651 1.571 0.902 1.955 ***
Times cited 16.077 37.021 24.205 48.012 ***
SJR 4.100 3.751 3.973 3.812 **
Pages 22.023 11.025 20.026 10.409 ***
Obs 6,660 44,852
Note: q is the quality of the paper.
It is calculated according to equation (5).
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
Table 24: Comparison between solo-authored papers and co-authored papers
3.4.3 Result: Paper Production Function
Table 25 reports the estimates of the paper production function, splitting the results by the
number of authors. The number of authors significantly increases the quality of the paper. The
point estimate of the substitution parameter ρ for the full sample is around −0.037, implying the
elasticity of substitution between researchers of 0.964. Thus, our results suggest that researchers
are imperfect complements. Our estimate of the elasticity of substitution is smaller than that
between different types of workers. The estimates of the elasticity of substitution range from
1.2 to 2 between skilled and unskilled workers, from 20 to 30 between immigrants and native
workers, and from 1 to 1.4 between male and female workers. The elasticity of substitution
between researchers is relatively small due to the nature of work that researchers do. The high
degree of complexity of economic research requires researchers to specialize in a small set of
tasks, which makes it hard to replace one researcher with another. Plus, research teams often
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consist of researchers with the comparative advantage on different tasks because otherwise, it
will be better for them to work by themselves.
All Duet Trio Quartet Quintet
b1 0.447***
(0.024)
b2 -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.036*** -0.021*** -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
ρ -0.037 -0.036 -0.073 -0.042 -0.008
σ 0.964 0.965 0.932 0.960 0.992
[0.963,0.965] [0.964,0.967] [0.929,0.935] [0.955,0.965] [0.987,0.996]
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 44,852 22,597 16,147 4,960 1,148
R-sq 0.039 0.034 0.044 0.029 0.044
The substitution parameter ρ is calculated as 2b2. b1 = β.
The elasticity of substitution σ is calculated as 11−ρ .
One standard deviation confidence intervals in brackets are obtained
using the delta method.
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
Table 25: CES production function, OLS regression
3.5 Collaboration and Research Productivity
In this section, we investigate the effects of collaboration among researchers on human
capital. With the estimated parameters and human capital of researchers, we simulate human
capital growth under various scenarios.
First, we compare two different scenarios. We consider a researcher whose human capital
is in the 50th percentile in period t. In scenario 1, the researcher produces one solo paper.
In scenario 2, the researcher produces one co-authored paper with one coauthor whose human
capital is also in the 50th percentile. We then compare the growth of researcher’s human
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capital over time between the two scenarios. After the initial collaboration, the growth paths
of the number of papers, coauthors, and the average coauthor human capital are determined
by the percent increase in human capital and the estimates from section 4.2. For instance, the
average coauthor human capital of researcher r increases by (0.305)(100)Hrt+1−Hrt
Hrt
from period
t to period t+ 1.
As shown in the top panel in Figure 5, the researcher experiences higher and faster human
capital growth in scenario 2 than in scenario 1. The bottom panel in Figure 26 plots the
percentage difference in human capital between the two scenarios. In period t, collaboration
generates 28% higher human capital than solo work. This ‘teamwork premium’ reaches around
49% in period t+ 5 and slowly decreases thereafter.
Figure 26: Comparison of the human capital growth between solo-work and co-work
The effects of collaboration persist over time. A rise in human capital from the initial
collaboration gives the researcher more collaboration opportunities with more productive re-
searchers, which leads to even more growth of human capital. As shown in Figure 27, the
researcher in scenario 2 participates in more co-authorship and works with more productive
coauthors throughout research life. To have a closer look at the source of the long-run effects of
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collaboration, we do a counterfactual analysis where we ignore the link between human capital
and the quantity and quality of co-authorship. We assume from period t+ 1 on, the researcher
produces one solo paper and one co-authored paper every period. The average coauthor human
capital is fixed at period t level. Figure 28 plots the teamwork premium in this case. The
benefits of collaboration do not last long. The teamwork premium decreases quickly with time.
Figure 27: Collaboration and the quantity and quality of co-authorship over time
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Figure 28: Teamwork premium with an exogenous co-authorship formation
The benefits of collaboration can vary across different types of individuals. Ductor (2015)
argues that more-able researchers can enjoy the benefit from collaboration to a greater extent
because more able authors tend to have highly productive co-authors while less able authors
collaborate with low-productivity researchers. We revisit this argument by controlling for the
productivity of coauthors. We calculate the teamwork premium of collaborating with an equally
productive coauthor by researchers’ human capital. Figure 29 presents the results. Observing
equally productive pairs, we find that the immediate benefits of collaboration are actually
bigger for low productivity researchers. However, in the long run, highly productive researchers
benefit more from collaboration.
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Figure 29: Teamwork premium by human capital
The benefits of collaboration can also differ according to coauthors’ human capital. We
assign coauthors with different human capital to a researcher with the median human capital
and see how his human capital evolves over time. The results are presented in Figure 30. We
find that collaborating with more productive researchers generates higher teamwork premium.
Collaboration with an equally productive researcher yields about 40% of teamwork premium
on average. Having a more productive researcher whose human capital is in the 75th percentile
increases the premium to about 51%. Working with a low-productivity researcher, on the
contrary, decreases the premium to about 29%.
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Figure 30: Teamwork premium by coauthor’s human capital
Figure 31 plots the teamwork premium by the number of coauthors. We assume the re-
searchers’ human capital is all in the 50th percentile. We find that the teamwork premium
decreases with the number of coauthors. Collaborating with two equally productive coauthors
decreases the teamwork premium to 32%. Adding one more equally productive coauthor de-
creases the teamwork premium further to 29%.
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Figure 31: Teamwork premium by the number of coauthors
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between academic collaboration and research
productivity. We specify the human capital function of researchers and the production func-
tion of research outcomes. In our framework, researchers’ human capital is a function of their
publication histories. Once a group of researchers decides to collaborate, their human cap-
ital is combined in the manner of CES and produces a research outcome. The elasticity of
substitution parameter in the research outcome production function measures the degree of
complementarities between any two researchers.
We estimate the researchers’ human capital function and the research outcome production
function using the data on published articles in the field of Economics and Business. The
estimated value of the elasticity of substitution suggests that researchers are imperfect com-
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plements. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to estimate the elasticity of substitution
between academics.
The estimated functions show that academia consists of a large number of researchers
with low human capital and only a few researchers with high human capital. We also find that
collaboration mostly takes place among equally productive researchers. Human capital is closely
related to the amount of co-authorship and the quality of coauthors. We show evidence that
researchers with higher human capital produce more co-authored papers with more productive
coauthors. A 1% increase in human capital is associated with a 0.3% increase in coauthors’
human capital.
We then simulate the growth of human capital of a researcher under different collaboration
scenarios. We assign a researcher with the median human capital a different set of coauthors
and observe how his human capital grows over time. The researcher’s human capital is around
40% higher when collaborating with an equally productive coauthor than working by himself.
This teamwork premium persists over time. The persistence stems from the fact that the initial
increase of human capital from collaboration translates into more collaboration opportunities
with more productive coauthors.
The effects of collaboration vary by researchers’ own human capital, the coauthors’ human
capital, and the number of coauthors. We find that low productivity researchers benefit more
from collaboration with an equally productive researcher in the short run. However it is the
highly productive researchers who benefit more in the long run. Collaboration with more
productive researchers yields a higher teamwork premium. Collaboration with more than one
coauthor decreases the teamwork premium.
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Appendix A Chapter 1
A.1 Value Functions for High-skill Workers
A.1.1 Unemployed Workers
Uht (a, b, j) = max
a′
u(c, Lu) + χβ[max
µ′
m(θt+1(h, j, µ
′))Eht+1(a
′, µ′, j)
+ (1−m(θt+1(h, j, µ′)))U lt+1(a′, µ′, j)] + (1− χ)β[max
µ′
m(θt+1(h, j, µ
′))Eht+1(a
′, µ′, j)
+ (1−m(θt+1(h, j, µ′)))U lt+1(a′, µ′, j)], t ≤ T
UhT+1(a, b, j) = 0
s.t c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+ b and a′ ≥ a
A.1.2 Employed Workers
Eht (a, µ, j) = max
a′
u(c, Le) + β[δjU
h
t+1(a
′, b, j) + (1− δj)Eht+1(a′, µ, j)], t ≤ T
EhT+1(a, µ, j) = 0
s.t c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+ (1− τ)w(θt(h, j, µ)) and a′ ≥ a
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A. Male Non-participants Participants
Percent non-routine cognitive 12.99 27.78 ***
Percent non-routine manual 12.44 11.11
Percent routine cognitive 10.81 25.00 ***
Percent routine manual 63.77 36.11 ***
B. Female Non-participants Participants
Percent non-routine cognitive 20.47 21.97
Percent non-routine manual 23.01 30.30 **
Percent routine cognitive 40.00 41.67
Percent routine manual 16.53 6.06 ***
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
The corresponding table for the NLSY79 can be found in the Appendix.
Source: NLSY79.
Table 27: Occupation by sex (participants vs. non-participants)
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Age Asset
Low-skill
Employed Unemployed
Participants Non-participants
18-22
1st quartile -0.006 -0.002 -0.001
2nd quartile -0.005 -0.002 -0.003
3rd quartile -0.019 -0.008 -0.001
4th quartile -0.147 -0.037 -0.001
23-27
1st quartile -3.76E-04 -0.003 -4.52E-05
2nd quartile -7.43E-04 -0.003 -2.07E-04
3rd quartile -0.003 -0.014 -3.12E-04
4th quartile -0.183 -0.114 -0.001
28-32
1st quartile -3.48E-05 -0.002 -4.70E-06
2nd quartile -1.22E-04 -0.001 -1.67E-05
3rd quartile -4.06E-04 -0.007 -5.73E-05
4th quartile -0.076 -0.056 -3.41E-04
33-37
1st quartile -1.81E-05 -4.54E-04 -6.24E-06
2nd quartile -1.07E-04 -4.38E-04 -4.48E-06
3rd quartile -4.77E-06 -0.003 -3.01E-07
4th quartile -0.020 -0.020 -5.71E-05
38-42
1st quartile -2.24E-05 -2.32E-05 -7.77E-06
2nd quartile -1.11E-04 -5.51E-05 -5.53E-06
3rd quartile -2.22E-05 -6.44E-04 -1.12E-06
4th quartile -0.005 -0.005 -4.51E-06
43-47
1st quartile -1.50E-05 0.000 -5.37E-06
2nd quartile -6.58E-05 0.000 -5.91E-06
3rd quartile -6.28E-05 -2.79E-05 -5.25E-06
4th quartile -0.001 -2.60E-04 -1.16E-05
48-52
1st quartile -8.84E-06 0.000 -7.95E-07
2nd quartile -7.17E-05 0.000 -1.18E-06
3rd quartile -0.005 0.000 -1.49E-04
4th quartile -0.005 0.000 -1.45E-04
Overall -0.475 -0.277 -0.009
Note: This table presents detailed welfare analysis of scenario 2 in Table 12.
Results reported as change(%) in the remaining lifetime consumption relative
to the benchmark economy.
Table 28: Welfare changes for low-skill workers, tax effects excluded
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Age Asset
Low-skill
Employed Unemployed
Participants Non-participants
18-22
1st quartile -0.018 -0.002 -0.006
2nd quartile -0.030 -0.002 -0.007
3rd quartile -0.023 -0.008 -0.002
4th quartile -0.158 -0.039 -0.002
23-27
1st quartile -0.006 -0.003 -0.002
2nd quartile -0.030 -0.003 -0.002
3rd quartile -0.003 -0.014 -4.89E-04
4th quartile -0.190 -0.117 -0.001
28-32
1st quartile -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
2nd quartile -0.028 -0.001 -0.001
3rd quartile -0.001 -0.007 -9.80E-05
4th quartile -0.078 -0.057 -4.21E-04
33-37
1st quartile -0.005 -4.55E-04 -0.002
2nd quartile -0.028 -4.39E-04 -0.001
3rd quartile -1.25E-04 -0.003 -1.38E-05
4th quartile -0.020 -0.020 -6.63E-05
38-42
1st quartile -0.005 -2.32E-05 -0.002
2nd quartile -0.023 -5.51E-05 -0.001
3rd quartile -0.003 -0.001 -1.91E-04
4th quartile -0.010 -0.005 -1.30E-04
43-47
1st quartile -0.002 0.000 -0.001
2nd quartile -0.011 0.000 -0.001
3rd quartile -0.005 -2.80E-05 -0.001
4th quartile -0.033 -2.60E-04 -0.001
48-52
1st quartile -1.76E-04 0.000 -4.58E-05
2nd quartile -3.96E-04 0.000 -3.38E-05
3rd quartile -0.014 0.000 -3.70E-04
4th quartile -0.053 0.000 -0.001
Overall -0.779 -0.283 -0.035
Note: This table presents detailed welfare analysis of scenario 3 in Table 12.
Results reported as change(%) in the remaining lifetime consumption relative
to the benchmark economy.
Table 29: Welfare changes for low-skill workers, firm choice effects excluded
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Age Asset
Low-skill
Employed Unemployed
Participants Non-participants
18-22
1st quartile -0.018 -0.002 -0.006
2nd quartile -0.029 -0.002 -0.007
3rd quartile -0.027 -0.008 -0.002
4th quartile -0.158 -0.039 -0.002
23-27
1st quartile -0.006 -0.003 -0.002
2nd quartile -0.029 -0.003 -0.002
3rd quartile -0.004 -0.014 -4.74E-04
4th quartile -0.187 -0.116 -0.001
28-32
1st quartile -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
2nd quartile -0.028 -0.001 -0.001
3rd quartile -0.001 -0.007 -9.65E-05
4th quartile -0.077 -0.056 -3.93E-04
33-37
1st quartile -0.005 -4.55E-04 -0.002
2nd quartile -0.028 -4.39E-04 -0.001
3rd quartile 0.000 -0.003 -1.38E-05
4th quartile -0.020 -0.020 -6.63E-05
38-42
1st quartile -0.005 -2.32E-05 -0.002
2nd quartile -0.023 -5.51E-05 -0.001
3rd quartile -0.003 -0.001 -1.91E-04
4th quartile -0.017 -0.005 -1.30E-04
43-47
1st quartile -0.002 0.00 -0.001
2nd quartile -0.011 0.00 -0.001
3rd quartile -0.005 -2.80E-05 -0.001
4th quartile -0.033 -2.60E-04 -0.001
48-52
1st quartile -1.76E-04 0.00 -4.57E-05
2nd quartile -3.96E-04 0.00 -3.37E-05
3rd quartile -0.014 0.00 -3.70E-04
4th quartile -0.053 0.00 -0.001
Overall -0.786 -0.281 -0.034
Note: This table presents detailed welfare analysis of scenario 4 in Table 12.
Results reported as change(%) in the remaining lifetime consumption relative
to the benchmark economy.
Table 30: Welfare changes for low-skill workers, saving effects excluded
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Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 5
18-22
1st quartile 0.1226 0.0776 0.0974 0.2455 0.0771
2nd quartile 0.0998 0.0469 0.0506 0.1358 0.0522
3rd quartile 0.0750 0.0335 0.0347 0.1040 0.0300
4th quartile 0.1417 0.0547 0.0506 0.2029 0.0430
23-27
1st quartile 0.0524 0.0504 0.0683 0.1464 0.0579
2nd quartile 0.0602 0.0306 0.0339 0.0832 0.0433
3rd quartile 0.0601 0.0266 0.0293 0.0889 0.0360
4th quartile 0.3294 0.1178 0.1108 0.4852 0.1279
28-32
1st quartile -0.0019 0.0299 0.0453 0.0652 0.0294
2nd quartile 0.0406 0.0218 0.0251 0.0587 0.0384
3rd quartile 0.0403 0.0202 0.0235 0.0652 0.0364
4th quartile 0.2116 0.0801 0.0815 0.3338 0.1733
33-37
1st quartile -0.0370 0.0159 0.0278 0.0042 -0.0044
2nd quartile 0.0187 0.0122 0.0157 0.0340 0.0257
3rd quartile 0.0183 0.0124 0.0162 0.0389 0.0307
4th quartile 0.0917 0.0403 0.0467 0.1815 0.1402
38-42
1st quartile -0.0309 0.0078 0.0165 -0.0141 -0.0104
2nd quartile -0.0081 0.0043 0.0064 8.6706e-04 1.8953e-04
3rd quartile -0.0102 0.0048 0.0084 5.1245e-04 0.0018
4th quartile -0.0216 0.0123 0.0209 0.0196 0.0143
43-47
1st quartile -0.0096 0.0022 0.0092 -0.0124 -0.0033
2nd quartile -0.0075 0.0018 0.0042 -0.0139 -0.0026
3rd quartile -0.0238 0.0056 0.0134 -0.0428 -0.0083
4th quartile -0.1314 0.0207 0.0481 -0.0506 -0.0322
48-52
1st quartile -0.0023 5.2379e-04 0.005 -0.1299 -7.8855e-04
2nd quartile -0.0739 0.0273 0.4620 -0.6172 -0.0255
3rd quartile -0.0656 0.1300 0.0564 -0.3914 -0.0290
4th quartile -0.0476 0.0129 0.0308 -0.0840 -0.0237
Overall 0.8913 0.9012 1.4545 0.9383 0.8174
Note: Policy 1: Government pays all the retraining costs. Policy 2: Retraining participants
can receive unemployment benefit for a longer period of time than non-participants (up
to two years). Policy 3: Retraining participants can receive higher unemployment benefit
than non-participants Policy 4: No UI benefit + free retraining Policy 5: Government pays
retraining costs only for selected population (older and/or low-assets)
Results reported as percent change (percentage point change in case of retraining rate)
relative to the benchmark scenario.
Table 31: Comparison in welfare across policies (low-skill workers)
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Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 5
18-22
1st quartile -0.4963 0.1457 0.1982 -0.0938 -0.2122
2nd quartile -0.4458 0.0743 0.1065 -0.0376 -0.1506
3rd quartile -0.0765 0.0166 0.0237 -0.0069 -0.0257
4th quartile -0.0015 3.2954e-04 4.7050e-04 -1.3884e-04 -5.0454e-04
23-27
1st quartile -0.1270 0.0659 0.1617 -0.0277 -0.2651
2nd quartile -0.4365 0.0752 0.0866 -0.0266 -0.1244
3rd quartile -0.1367 0.0292 0.0416 -0.0123 -0.0455
4th quartile -0.0256 0.0057 0.0081 -0.0025 -0.0087
28-32
1st quartile -0.0331 0.0095 0.0143 -0.0077 -0.0125
2nd quartile -1.1446 0.5707 0.1658 -0.0555 -0.1692
3rd quartile -0.2423 0.0375 0.0522 -0.0186 -0.0854
4th quartile -0.0629 0.0141 0.0202 -0.0067 -0.0215
33-37
1st quartile -0.0214 0.0052 0.0075 -0.0053 -0.0076
2nd quartile -0.4652 0.0557 0.1077 -0.1901 -0.0957
3rd quartile -0.2579 0.0606 0.1123 -0.0658 -0.1305
4th quartile -0.0873 0.0197 0.0282 -0.0105 -0.0300
38-42
1st quartile -0.0116 0.0028 0.0040 -0.0033 -0.0041
2nd quartile -0.1353 0.0491 0.0601 -0.0165 -0.1812
3rd quartile -0.5483 0.0722 0.0919 -0.0675 -0.1394
4th quartile -0.1109 0.0247 0.0353 -0.0162 -0.0377
43-47
1st quartile -0.0036 8.5922e-04 0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0013
2nd quartile -0.0391 0.0096 0.0207 -0.0092 -0.0167
3rd quartile -0.2749 0.0415 0.0794 -0.0619 -0.0554
4th quartile -0.3345 0.0613 0.0950 -0.0746 -0.0642
48-52
1st quartile -3.8490e-04 8.9205e-05 1.2788e-04 -0.0169 -1.3426e-04
2nd quartile -0.0351 0.0147 0.0534 -1.4407 -0.0113
3rd quartile -0.3295 0.0365 0.0756 -0.5124 -0.0877
4th quartile -0.0267 0.0055 0.0076 -0.0154 -0.0088
Overall -5.9104 1.5051 1.6595 -2.8038 -1.9930
Note: Policy 1: Government pays all the retraining costs. Policy 2: Retraining participants can
receive unemployment benefit for a longer period of time than non-participants (up to two years).
Policy 3: Retraining participants can receive higher unemployment benefit than non-participants
Policy 4: No UI benefit + free retraining Policy 5: Government pays retraining costs only for
selected population (older and/or low-assets)
Results reported as percent change (percentage point change in case of retraining rate) relative to
the benchmark scenario.
Table 32: Comparison in welfare across policies (high-skill workers)
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Counterfactual 1: an economy with a high retraining com-
pletion rate, Benchmark: an economy with a low retraining
completion rate, Counterfactual 2 : an economy where re-
training doesn’t exist.
Figure 32: Age-wage profiles by skill
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A.3 Solution Algorithm
Starting at t = T and working backwards, the solution is given as:
1. Compute the firm value function, Jt(s, j, µ).
2. Computer the market tightness, θt(s, j, µ), by equation (9).
3. Guess a value for the income tax rate, τ .
4. Solve the employed high-skill worker problem for all t, a, µ, j and compute optimal savings
aht+1(at, µ, j).
5. Solve the unemployed high-skill worker problem for all t, a, b, j and compute optimal savings
aht+1(at, b, j) and optimal firm choices θ
h
t+1(at, b, j).
6. Solve the employed low-skill worker problem for all t, a, µ, ψ, j and compute optimal savings
alt+1(at, µ, ψ, j).
7. Solve the low-skill non-participant problem for all t, a, µ, ψ, j and compute optimal savings
alt+1(at, µ, ψ, j) and optimal firm choices θ
l
t+1(at, b, ψ, j).
8. Solve the low-skill participant problem for all t, a, µ, ψ, j, z and compute optimal savings
alt+1(at, µ, ψ, j, z) and optimal firm choices θ
l
t+1(at, b, ψ, j, z).
9. Solve the retraining decision for low-skill unemployed workers and recover Dt(a, b, ψ, j).
10. Using the policy functions, compute the distribution functions over the state variables.
11. Using the policy functions and distribution functions, compute the total tax revenue and
government expenditure on unemployment insurance benefit. Check if the government
budget is balanced.
12. If the government budget is balanced, the model is solved. If not, go back to 3 and adjust
the tax rate.
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Appendix B Chapter 3
Journal SJR
1 Quarterly Journal of Economics 30.490
2 Journal of Political Economy 22.902
3 Journal of Finance 17.973
4 Econometrica 17.635
5 Review of Economic Studies 14.499
6 Journal of Financial Economics 13.636
7 Journal of Labor Economics 13.590
8 Review of Financial Studies 12.516
9 Journal of Human Resources 12.363
10 American Economic Review 11.889
11 Journal of Accounting Research 10.151
12 Journal of Marketing 9.198
13 Journal of Economic Literature 9.194
14 Annual Review of Economics 8.790
15 Review of Economics and Statistics 8.363
16 Journal of Monetary Economics 7.248
17 Journal of Marketing Research 6.895
18 Marketing Science 6.853
19 Journal of Accounting and Economics 6.606
20 Journal of Consumer Research 6.590
21 Journal of Economic Growth 6.312
22 Journal of Economic Perspectives 6.085
23 Journal of International Business Studies 5.548
24 Accounting Review 5.240
25 Quantitative Economics 5.177
26 Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 5.073
27 Economic Journal 5.009
28 Review of Economic Dynamics 4.990
29 Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 4.801
30 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 4.663
31 Annual Review of Financial Economics 4.584
32 Journal of Econometrics 4.485
33 International Economic Review 4.376
continued . . .
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Journal SJR
34 RAND Journal of Economics 4.376
35 Journal of International Economics 4.347
36 Economic Policy 4.169
37 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 3.986
38 Journal of Public Economics 3.691
39 Journal of Financial Intermediation 3.514
40 Journal of Economic Theory 3.467
41 Review of Finance 3.465
42 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 3.449
43 Journal of Development Economics 3.432
44 Economic Geography 2.915
45 Journal of Economic Geography 2.902
46 Contemporary Accounting Research 2.895
47 Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 2.886
48 Journal of International Marketing 2.866
49 Mathematical Finance 2.834
50 Journal of Applied Econometrics 2.817
51 Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 2.817
52 Econometric Theory 2.810
53 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 2.772
54 Journal of Urban Economics 2.724
55 Real Estate Economics 2.531
56 International Journal of Production Economics 2.475
57 Auditing 2.417
58 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 2.357
59 Journal of Financial Econometrics 2.282
60 World Development 2.254
61 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2.232
62 European Economic Review 2.210
63 Economic Development and Cultural Change 2.174
64 Conflict Management and Peace Science 2.140
65 Journal of Economic History 2.117
66 Economics of Education Review 2.098
67 Economica 2.087
68 Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2.083
69 Review of International Organizations 2.053
70 Economic Theory 2.032
71 Journal of Common Market Studies 2.017
72 Energy Economics 2.003
continued . . .
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Journal SJR
73 Review of International Political Economy 1.935
74 Small Business Economics 1.913
75 American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1.906
76 Annual Review of Resource Economics 1.894
77 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1.888
78 Journal of Business Ethics 1.860
79 Journal of Economic Surveys 1.847
80 Agricultural Economics 1.815
81 Journal of Law and Economics 1.815
82 Scandinavian Journal of Economics 1.815
83 Games and Economic Behavior 1.814
84 Econometrics Journal 1.813
85 Post-Soviet Affairs 1.790
86 Food Policy 1.782
87 Ecological Economics 1.767
88 World Bank Economic Review 1.757
89 Journal of Corporate Finance 1.748
90 Economic Systems Research 1.738
91 Business Ethics 1.723
92 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1.714
93 Science Technology and Human Values 1.714
94 Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A, (Statistics in Society) 1.690
95 Journal of Family Business Strategy 1.683
96 Work, Employment and Society 1.644
97 International Journal of Electronic Commerce 1.634
98 Judgment and Decision Making 1.601
99 Journal of Banking and Finance 1.599
100 Journal of Demographic Economics 1.581
Table 33: Journal list
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